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I.

INTRODUCTION

Since July 1, 1971, when the 1970 Illinois Constitution became generally effective,one of the most-discussed innovations
of the constitution has been home rule. Article VII, section 6
grants automatic home rule status to the largest Illinois municipalities and to Cook County. It also allows every municipality
and county, regardless of size or population, to obtain home rule
status by referendum.
The powers and responsibilties of Illinois home rule municipalities are exceptionally broad. From the days when the con* Prof. of Law at The John Marshall Law School. A.B., Grinnel
College; J.D., University of Chicago Law School.
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vention was drafting the proposal until today, commentators
within and outside Illinois have suggested that Illinois home
rule is the most powerful in the nation.
The essence of home rule power is set forth in article VII,
section 6(a):
(a) A County which has a chief executive officer elected by the
electors of the county and any municipality which has a population
of more than 25,000 are home rule units. Other municipalities may
elect to become home rule units. Except as limited by this Section,
a home rule unit may exercise any power and perform any function
pertaining to its government and affairs including, but not limited
to, the power to regulate for the protection of the public health,
safety, morals and welfare; to license; to tax; and to incur debt.
These words, however, are merely the bare bones of modern
municipal power in Illinois. To see whether home rule is merely
a skeleton we must scrutinize (1) the way municipalities have
used their home rule powers; (2) the way the judiciary has interpreted home rule powers and legislation regarding home rule;
and (3) the way the General Assembly has attempted to regulate and pre-empt home rule powers. In the fourteen years
since home rule became available there have been at least two
attempts to summarize the home rule experience in law review
articles.' This "recent developments" project is the third. Like
its predecessors, it concentrates upon the recent developments
in supreme and appellate court cases.
The report falls into four main divisions paralleling the
grant of, and limitations on, home rule powers found in article
VII, section 6, subsections (a) through (m). The main divisions
include a brief introductory background before examining recent developments in Illinois case law.
The John Marshall Law Review hopes that general practitioners, as well as those who labor in this rather special vineyard, find this report both interesting and useful. As one who
has cultivated the field since the seeds were planted, I can attest
to the importance of this report in understanding home rule.
II.

WHAT "PERTAINS TO" LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND AFAIRS
A. Background

Article VII, section 6(a) of the Illinois Constitution of 1970
grants limited home rule powers to local government units.
1. See Michael & Norton, Home Rule in Illinois: A FunctionalAnalysis,
1978 U. ILL. L.F. 559; Biebel, Home Rule in Illinois After Two Years: An Un-

certain Beginning, 6 J. MAR.J. Pac. &PIoc. 253 (1973).
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Those municipalities that either elect 2 to become or otherwise
qualify3 as home rule units "may exercise any power and perform any function pertaining to [their] government and affairs
including, but not limited to, the power to regulate for the protection of health, safety, morals and welfare; to license; to tax;
and to incur debt."'4 This grant of power, while superficially specific, is limited by the requirement that a municipality's home
rule activities must pertain to its government and affairs. Judicial interpretation of this restriction has played a primary role in
determining the scope of the home rule power.
The analysis of what pertains to local government and affairs turns upon establishing what is "local." To determine
whether an activity is local, Illinois courts have utilized several
different approaches. Courts may analyze the effect of the governmental activity; courts may apply a traditional preemption
analysis; or, courts may look at the nature of the governmental
activity.
In analyzing the effect of the local governmental activity,
courts have attempted to balance the challenged activity's intraterritorial effect against its extra-territorial effect. The effect of
local regulation may be, to some extent, extra-territorial, 5 however, if the governmental activity's primary effect is outside of
the municipality. Accordingly, if the primary effect of a home
rule regulation is outside the municipality, then the regulation
does not apply to local government and affairs. 6 This approach
is relatively restrictive because determining what pertains to local government is not gauged by local effect but rather, by the
extent of more far-reaching regional or statewide effects.
Alternatively, a court might apply a traditional preemption
analysis. Under this approach, some activities, regardless of
2. "Other Municipalities may elect by referendum to become home
rule units." ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(a).
3. "A County which has a chief executive officer elected by the electors
of the county and any municipality which has a population of more than
25,000 are home rule units." ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(a).
4. ILL. CONST. art. VIH, § 6(a).
5. City of Des Plaines v. Metropolitan Sanitary District, 59 IMI.2d 29, 319
N.E.2d 9 (1974) (zoning and pollution ordinances of Des Plaines could not
regulate or restrict the activities of a regional governmental authority.)
6. City of Des Plaines v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 65 IMI.2d 1, 357 N.E.2d 433
(1976). A Des Plaines ordinance regulating noise emmissions was not authorized under the home rule powers because it was regulating a problem
"of local concern." Id. at 7, 357 N.E. 2d at 436. See also Metropolitan San.

2d 256, 347 N.E.2d 716 (1976). This case
Dist. v. City of Des Plaines, 63 IMI.

dealt with Des Plaines' attempted regulation of a regional authority; the

supreme court reasoned that "to permit a regional district to be regulated
by a part of that region [was I incompatible with the purpose for which [the
regional district] was created." Id. at 261, 347 N.E.2d at 719.
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their apparently local nature or effect, are considered to be of
statewide concern. 7 Preemption is determined by stated legislative purposes or goals or by legislative activity. The courts have
not, however, held that any exercise of legislative power necessarily precludes all exercise of municipal power.8 Rather, the
courts have recognized that under some circumstances the state
may exercise exclusive power while other situations may favor a
concurrent exercise of power. 9
Finally, the very nature of governmental activity may establish it as of either state or local concern. 10 Analysis of the nature
of governmental activity is necessarily related to both the preemption and the effect analyses. In fact, all three methods of
analysis often overlap.
On each occasion that the Illinois courts have approved a
home rule unit's actions, the courts have either expressly or impliedly found the action to be within the section 6(a) grant of
power." Therefore, a discussion of what pertains to local government and affairs may be grounded on municipal activities
that have been approved in the courts. This analysis of decisions should thereby establish the scope of home rule in Illinois.
The section 6(a) authority to regulate to protect health,
safety, morals, and welfare is often coextensive with the municipality's licensing, taxing, and debt incurring powers. Therefore,
it is sometimes difficult to categorize specific municipal activities into the non-exclusive home rule categories provided by
section 6(a). As a basis for organization, however, the section
6(a) categories provide the most logical approach.
The authority to regulate to protect health, safety, morals
and welfare provides a broad basis for local police power. In
7. See e.g., Andruss v. City of Evanston, 68 Ill. 2d 215, 369 N.E.2d 1258
(1977) cert. denied, 435 U.S. 952 (1978). (regulation and licensing of real estate brokers preempted by state statutes); City of Des Plaines v. Chicago &

N.W. Ry., 65 Ill. 2d 1, 357 N.E.2d 433 (1977) (noise pollution is essentially of

state-wide concern); United Private Detective and Sec. Ass'n v. City of Chi-

cago, 62 Ill. 2d 506, 343 N.E.2d 453 (1976) (state preemption of licensing and

regulation of private detectives).
8. "Home rule units may exercise and perform concurrently with the
State any power or function of a home rule unit to the extent that the General Assembly by law does not specifically limit the concurrent exercise or
specifically declare the State's exercise to be exclusive." ILL. CONST. art.
VII, § 6(i).
9. E.g., City of Des Plaines v. Chicago &N.W. Ry., 65 Ill. 2d 1, 357 N.E.2d
433 (1977).

10. See, e.g., Ampersand, Inc. v. Finley, 61 Ill. 2d 537, 338 N.E.2d 15 (1975)
(right of access to state's court system, by nature, of state concern).
11. Presumptively, no court would allow a home rule unit to exercise
authority that did not pertain to its government and affairs since that provides the basis for the home rule grant of power.
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County of Cook v. John Sexton Contractors Co. ,12 a home rule
county attempted to impose restrictions on a landfill in addition
to state regulations. 13 The Illinois Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) issued Sexton the necessary permits for the operation of a sanitary landfill. Cook County, however, refused to
allow the operation of the landfill absent compliance with
county regulations.' 4 Sexton contended that its compliance
with state EPA regulations was sufficient and that the state statutes preempted the area of environmental protection.' 5 The Illinois Supreme Court held that pollution was equally a state and
a local concern. 16 Regardless of the extent of state environmental regulation, the court held that the state and county possessed concurrent authority.' 7 Therefore, Sexton was required
to comply with state EPA standards and Cook County's sanitary
landfill zoning requirements. 18 Further, in City of Chicago v.
Pollution Control Board,' 9 the supreme court held that regardless of a home rule unit's regulations, state EPA regulations provided minimum standards. Thus, the state may establish
minimum levels of regulation, but local authorities may impose
20
more restrictive pollution standards.
Beyond the area of concurrent regulation, home rule units
possess a broad range of power to protect health, morals, safety
and welfare. For example, City of Evanston v. Create Inc.2 1 allowed a home rule city to regulate and control apartment rentals; City of Belleville v. Kesler22 affirmed a home rule city's
power to regulate or restrict commercial signs; City of Chicago v.
Pioneer Towing, Inc. 23 recognized a home rule city's authority to
regulate private towing operations; Laundry v. Smith 24 recognized concurrent city and state regulation of landlord-tenant relations; City of Crystal Lake v. Cunningham25 affirmed a city
ordinance which prohibited parking on city streets during early
morning hours; Rothner v. City of Chicago26 recognized a home
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

75 Il.
2d 494, 389 N.E.2d 553 (1979).
Id. at 502-03, 389 N.E.2d at 554.
Id. at 503, 389 N.E.2d at 554.
Id. citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111-1/2, 1001 (1977).
75 IM.2d at 509, 389 N.E.2d at 557.
Id. at 517, 389 N.E.2d at 561.
Id.
59 11l. 2d 484, 322 N.E.2d 11 (1974).
Id. at 489, 322 N.E.2d at 14.
85 Ill.
2d 101, 421 N.E.2d 196 (1981).
101 Ill.
App. 3d 710, 428 N.E.2d 617 (1981).
23. 73 Ill. App. 3d 867, 392 N.E.2d 132 (1979).
24. 66 II. App. 3d 616, 384 N.E.2d 430 (1978).
25. 52 11. App. 3d 819, 368 N.E.2d 142 (1977).

26. 66 Ill.
App. 3d 428, 383 N.E.2d 1218 (1978).
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rule city's authority to regulate nursing homes; Wes Ward Enterprises, Ltd. v. Andrews 27 allowed a home rule city to regulate
and license massage parlors. These cases are indicative of the
breadth of the police power under section 6(a).
Home rule units must, necessarily, have the authority to litigate. 28 Thus, home rule units possess the power to sue and be
sued.29 Additionally, home rule units possess the power to regulate and reform governmental structure. In People ex rel. Hanrahan v. Beck, 30 the Illinois Supreme Court upheld a Cook
County ordinance which created the office of County Comptroller.3 1 The ordinance provided that the comptroller would be appointed by the President of the County Board and that the
comptroller's power would be derived from those of the elected
County Clerk.32 In upholding the ordinance, the court held that
the ordinance did not eliminate the County Clerk's position, but
merely transferred ex officio powers to the new County Comptroller. 33 Therefore, the county ordinance was valid despite its
contravention of a statute which provided for the County Clerk

to act ex officio as County Comptroller.34
In Clarke v. Village of Arlington Heights,35 the village board
passed an ordinance, which was also adopted by referendum increasing the number of village trustees from six to eight and
36
changing the office of village clerk from elective to appointive.
The ordinance was upheld by the Illinois Supreme Court despite its contravention of the Illinois Municipal Code. 37
In Peters v. City of Springfield,38 the supreme court upheld a
city ordinance which lowered the mandatory retirement age for
police and firemen from sixty-three to sixty.3 9 In upholding the

ordinance, the court alowed Springfield's ordinance to super40
sede the statutorily mandated retirement age of sixty-three.
27. 42 Ill. App. 3d 458, 355 N.E.2d 131 (1976).
28. City of West Chicago v. DuPage County, 67 Ill. App. 3d 924, 385
N.E.2d 826 (1979).
29. Id. See also Forestview Homeowners Ass'n v. County of Cook, 18 Ill.
App. 3d 230, 309 N.E.2d 763 (1974).
30. 54 111. 2d 561, 301 N.E.2d 281 (1973).

31. Id. at 567, 301 N.E.2d at 284.
32. Id. at 562-63, 301 N.E.2d at 281-82.
33. Id. at 566-67, 301 N.E.2d at 283-84.
34. Id. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 34, 1142 (1971).
35. 57 111. 2d 50, 309 N.E.2d 576 (1974).
36. Id. at 50, 309 N.E.2d at 577.
37. Id. at 54-55, 309 N.E.2d at 579. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, 3-5-2 (1971)
(six village trustees); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, 3-5-9 (1971) (elected village
clerk).
38. 57 Ill. 2d 142, 311 N.E.2d 107 (1974).
39. Id. at 152, 311 N.E.2d at 112.
40. Id. at 144, 311 N.E.2d 108. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, 10-1-18 (1971).

19841

Home Rule in Illinois

The court's opinion was based on section 6(a)'s broad grant of
home rule powers. 4 1 In Allen v. County of Cook, 42 the supreme
court upheld a Cook County ordinance that reduced the votes
required for county board appropriations from two-thirds to a
simply majority. 43 A statute required two-thirds approval by the
county board of all appropriations over $5,000.00. 44 The County
Board passed an ordinance reducing the requirement to a simply majority. 45 The supreme court held that this was merely an
alteration of the mechanics of government and therefore, purely
a local matter.46
The Illinois Supreme Court has upheld several regulations
of municipal procedures. It upheld a city ordinance which altered police board review procedures in Pagliniv. Police Board
of City of Chicago.47 The ordinance upheld in Paglini allowed
for the appointment of police hearings officers who would sit at
police hearings and then report to the police board rather than
the statutory procedure of hearings directly in front of the police
board. 48 Similarly, in Stryker v. Village of Oak Park,4 9 the
supreme court upheld a village ordinance which replaced the
position of police captain with that of deputy police chiefL50 The
positions of police chief and deputy police chief were then made
terminable at the discretion of the village manager and removed
from police board review. 51 These changes were in apparent
contravention of the Illinois Municipal Code. 52 However, the
supreme court, held as it had in Hanrahan, Clarke, Peters, Allen, and Paglini, that the Illinois Municipal Code did not mandate uniformity 53 and that home rule ordinances presumptively
supersede statutes passed prior to the 1970 constitution.M
In City of Urbanav. Houser,55 a home rule city was allowed
41. Peters v. City of Springfield, 57 Ill. 2d 142, 149-52, 311 N.E.2d 107, 11112 (1974).
42. 65 Ill. 2d 281, 357 N.E.2d 458 (1976).
43. Id. at 285, 357 N.E.2d at 460.
44. Id. at 285, 357 N.E.2d at 460. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 34, 951 (1971).
45. Allen v. County of Cook, 65 IlM. 2d 281, 282, 357 N.E.2d 458, 459 (1976).
46. Id. at 285, 357 N.E.2d at 460.
47. 61 Mll.
2d 233, 236, 335 N.E.2d 480, 483 (1975).
48. Id. at 234-35, 335 N.E.2d at 482. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, $ 10-1-18.1
(1971).
49. 62 Ill. 2d 523, 343 N.E.2d 919, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 832, reh. denied, 429
U.S. 988 (1976).
50. Id. at 529, 343 N.E.2d at 923.
51. Id. at 524-26, 343 N.E.2d at 920-21.
52. Id.; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24 10-2.1-1 (1971).
53. Stryker v. Village of Oak Park, 62 Ill. 2d 523, 528, 343 N.E.2d 919, 92223, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 832 (1976).
54. Id. at 527, 343 N.E.2d at 922.
55. 67 Ill. 2d 268, 367 N.E.2d 692 (1977).

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 17:613

to condemn and demolish a building despite specific statutory
language that the zoning enabling act 5 6 did "not apply within the
jurisdiction of any home rule unit." The supreme court struck
the restricting clause from the statute,5 7 holding that home rule
powers were to be broadly and liberally construed5 8 and that
home rule communities should have all municipal powers
59
granted by statutes.
Section 6(a) grants home rule units the power to tax; however, section 6(e) prohibits taxes based "upon or measured by
income or earnings or upon occupations" except as provided for
by the general assembly.60 In determining the scope of the
home rule taxing power, one of the first cases established the
right of home rule units to tax property. In City of Evanston v.
County of Cook, 6 1 the supreme court upheld both city and
county ordinances which imposed a tax on the sale of new motor
vehicles. 62 The court found no conflict between the taxes and
held that they could be imposed simultaneously. 63 If the court
had found a conflict, section 6(c) states that the municipal ordi64
nance would prevail within the municipality's jurisdiction.
In Williams v. City of Chicago,65 the supreme court upheld
Chicago's transaction tax. 66 The tax was imposed upon transac-

tions involving the transfer of real property and the lease or
rental of certain specified personal property. 67 The tax was imposed at a higher rate against residents than non-residents. 68 In
upholding the tax, the court stated that municipalities have
broad discretion in imposing taxes as long as the municipality
acts reasonably.69 The classifications of who is taxed and at
56. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24,

11-31-1 (1971); see City of Urbana v. Houser,

67 Ill. 2d 268, 271, 367 N.E.2d 692, 693 (1977).
57. City of Urbana v. Houser, 67 111. 2d 268, 275, 367 N.E.2d 692, 695 (1977).
58. Id. at 272-73, 367 N.E.2d at 693-94.
59. Id. at 273, 367 N.E.2d at 694. See also City of Carbondale v. Van

Natta, 61 Ill. 2d 483, 338 N.E.2d 19 (1975) (upholding city action under municipal zoning power not under home rule power).
60. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(e) (1970).
61. 53 Ill. 2d 312, 291 N.E.2d 823 (1972).
62. Id. at 314, 291 N.E.2d at 824.
63. Id. at 319, 291 N.E.2d at 826-27.
64. "If a home rule county ordinance conflicts with an ordinance of a
municipality, the municipal ordinance shall prevail within its jurisdiction."
ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(c) (1970).
65. 66 Ill. 2d 423, 362 N.E.2d 1030, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 924 (1977).
66. Id. at 435, 362 N.E.2d at 1036.
67. Id. at 425, 362 N.E.2d at 1031.
68. Id. at 427, 362 N.E.2d at 1032.
69. Id. at 435, 362 N.E.2d at 1036.
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what rate must not be arbitrary. 70 The classification must bear a
71
reasonable relation to the municipality's legitimate objectives.
Finally, the court found a presumption in favor of the validity of
classifications which could only be overcome by proof of the
classification's arbitrary or unreasonable nature.72 In Williams,
the court found no arbitrariness or unreasonableness since the
taxes disproportionately collected from residents would be dis73
proportionately dispersed in favor of residents.
Similar to taxes with graduated burdens are taxes on special service areas; taxes imposed upon "special" geographic areas in order to offset the cost of special services provided to that
area. In Coryn v. City of Moline,74 the supreme court upheld a
city imposed special service area tax.75 Moline created a special
service area to provide a tax base for the building and maintenance of a shopping mall. 76 The tax area was challenged as pro77
viding a service for more than just the special service area.
The benefits of the mall, it was argued, would extend to the entire city, not just the special service area. 78 However, the
supreme court held that the benefits accruing to the rest of the
city did not mean that the mall was not "special" to the service
area. 79 The court, in recognizing the broad discretion held by
home rule units, held that while "the area taxed must be [the]
area served, the primary determination of that area is left to the
home rule unit. The degree and manner of correlation required
between the area taxed and the area served is not apparent on
the face of the constitutional provision ... J§ 6(1) (2) .,"80 However, this "does not mean that local... government [is] free to
gerrymander the boundaries of special service areas to maximize revenues, without regard to whether there is a rational re70. Id. at 432, 362 N.E.2d at 1035, citing, City of Chicago v. Ames, 365 Ill.
529, 7 N.E.2d 294 (1937).

71. Williams v. City of Chicago, 66 Ill. 2d 423, 432, 362 N.E.2d 1030, 1035
(1977), citing, Modern Dairy Co. v. Department of Revenue, 413 Ill. 55, 108
N.E.2d 8 (1952).
72. Williams v. City of Chicago, 66 Ill. 2d 423, 432-33, 362 N.E.2d 1030, 1035
(1977), citing, Jacobs v. City of Chicago, 53 Ill. 2d 421, 292 N.E.2d 401 (1973);
Thorpe v. Mahin, 43 Ill. 2d 36, 250 N.E.2d 633 (1969); Grenier &Co. v. Stevenson, 42 Ill. 2d 289, 247 N.E.2d 606 (1969); Doolin v. Korshak, 39 Ill. 2d 521, 236
N.E.2d 897 (1968).

73.
(1977).
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Williams v. City of Chicago, 66 Ill. 2d 423, 434-35, 362 N.E.2d 1030, 1036
71 Ill.
2d 194, 374 N.E.2d 211 (1978).
Id.at 202, 374 N.E.2d 214-15.
Id. at 198, 374 N.E.2d at 212-13.
Id.
Id. at 199, 374 N.E.2d at 213.

79. Id, at 201, 374 N.E.2d at 214.

80. Id,
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lationship between [the] property taxed and the property
served." 81 The court thereby recognized the discretion of home
rule units in establishing special service areas but also gave notice that special service areas do not provide carte blanche for
disproportionate taxation created by gerrymandering.
Similarly, a Cook County ordinance designating unincorporated Cook County a special service area was upheld. In Gilligan v. Korzen, 82 the supreme court upheld a wheel tax upon
83
vehicles owned by residents of unincorporated Cook County.
The court held that the tax and the special service area were
reasonable in relation to the county's special responsibilities to
the unincorporated areas of the county; 84 the service and the tax
were both applied to the same area.
Another area of concern in home rule taxing situations is
the prohibition of occupation taxes. 85 In Paper Supply Co. v.
City of Chicago,86 the supreme court upheld Chicago's "head
tax." Chicago imposed a tax upon all businesses that employed
fifteen or more full time employees. 87 The tax was challenged as
an occupation tax,88 but the court held that an occupation tax
either regulates a specific business or taxes the privilege of being a specific business. 8 9 This tax, the court found, taxed doing
business in general not particular occupations. °
In Jacobs v. City of Chicago,91 the supreme court upheld
Chicago's parking tax.9 2 The court held that the tax was not
upon the parking garages (as an occupation) but rather, upon
the consumers who parked in the garages.9 3 Similarly, in Town
of Cicero v. Fox Valley Trotting Club, Inc.,94 the supreme court
held that an admissions tax upon the patrons of a race track was
not an occupation tax upon the race track, but rather, a tax upon
the consumers.Similar in nature to the taxes in PaperSupply, Jacobs, and
Fox Valley Trotting, was a Peoria tax which was the subject of
81. Id. at 202, 374 N.E.2d at 214-15.
2d 387, 308 N.E.2d 613, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 841 (1974).
82. 56 Ill.
83. Id. at 388-89, 308 N.E.2d at 614.
84. Id. at 390, 308 N.E.2d at 614-15.
85. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(e) (1970).
86. 57 Ill.
2d 553, 317 N.E.2d 3 (1974).
87. Id. at 558, 317 N.E.2d at 5.
88. Id. at 559, 317 N.E.2d at 5-6.
89. Id. at 566, 317 N.E.2d at 9-10.
90. Id.
2d 421, 292 N.E.2d 401 (1973).
91. 53 Ill.
92. Id. at 429, 292 N.E.2d at 406.
93. Id. at 424, 292 N.E.2d at 403.
2d 10, 357 N.E.2d 1118 (1976).
94. 65 Ill.
95. Id. at 18, 357 N.E.2d at 1121.

Home Rule in Illinois

19841

two Illinois Supreme Court decisions. Peoria passed an ordinance that imposed a tax on attendance at amusements and on
the sale of food and alcoholic beverages in restaurants and taverns. 96 In Board of Education v. City of Peoria,97 the ordinance
was challenged as applied against public schools and the park
district. 98 Following the reasoning in their earlier decisions (Paper Supply, Jacobs, and Fox Valley Trotting) the court found
the tax not upon the schools or the parks but rather, on the ultimate consumer. 99 However, the court held the tax inapplicable
to the schools since their legislative authority did not include
the power to collect taxes. 10 0 The court did, however, uphold the
tax against the parks and stated that there was no presumption
that home rule municipalities could not impose taxes upon public institutions. 10 1 In Kerasotes Rialto Theater Corp. v. City of
Peoria,102 the same tax ordinance was challenged based upon
its arbitrary application. Kerasotes contended that the tax was
arbitrarily applied because the tax exemptions were based on
the nature of the seller-supplier while the tax was paid by the
consumer.10 3 The supreme court, however, found the classification of exemptions reasonable as based on the seller-supplier as
charitable, educational, or not-for-profit organizations.10 4 The
court held that patrons of the exempt organizations were often
there not only for amusement but also in a contributory sense
and therefore the profit/non-profit classification seemed
0 5
reasonable.
Additional taxes have also been approved by the Illinois
Supreme Court. In City of Rockford v. Gill,'0 6 the court upheld
a city library tax that exceeded the statutory level. 0 7 Acting
under its home rule authority, Rockford imposed a tax of .1604
percent upon all taxable property. 0 8 An Illinois statute provided for a .15 percent maximum. 0 9 However, the court upheld
96. Board of Educ. v. City of Peoria, 76 Ill. 2d 469, 471, 394 N.E.2d 399, 400
(1979); Kerasotes Rialto Theatre Corp. v. City of Peoria, 77111. 2d 491, 493, 397
N.E.2d 790, 791 (1979).
2d 469, 394 N.E.2d 399 (1979).
97. 76 Ill.

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 474, 394 N.E.2d at
Id. at 474-75, 394 N.E.2d
Id. at 477, 394 N.E.2d at
Id. at 477, 394 N.E.2d at

400-01.
at 401-02.
403.
403.

77 Mll.
2d 491, 397 N.E.2d 790 (1979).

Id. at 496, 397 N.E.2d at 793-94.
Id. at 498, 397 N.E.2d at 793-94.

Id.
75 11. 2d 334, 388 N.E.2d 384 (1979).
Id. at 338, 388 N.E.2d at 385. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 81, 3-1 (1975).
City of Rockford v. Gill, 75 Ill. 2d 334, 338, 388 N.E.2d 384, 385 (1979).

Id.
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the Rockford library tax since the statute had been enacted in
1965, prior to the adoption of home rule and therefore the tax
ceiling was not applicable to home rule units. 110
In Milligan v. Dunne,"' the court upheld a Cook County tax
on retail liquor sales." 2 The court addressed two major concerns: first, the tax was not an occupation tax since it was ultimately passed on to the consumer;" 3 and second, there was no
state preemption despite the extent of state regulation and taxation of liquor. 114 In S. Bloom, Inc. v. Korshak, n 5 the court upheld Chicago's cigarette tax." 6 The supreme court rejected the
contention that it was an occupation tax. 117 In Rozner v. Korshak," 8 the court upheld Chicago's wheel tax as a legitimate tax
and not as a prohibited license for revenue. 119
B.

Recent Developments

Although the home rule provisions of the Illinois State Constitution have been in effect for more than a decade, the phrase
"pertaining to its government and affairs" remains a subject of
litigation. The proper subject of home rule regulation under the
constitution remains open to judicial construction. This is especially true where a home rule unit enacts a city ordinance modifying or conflicting with an already existing state statute. The
majority of the recent cases discussed below fit into the category
of ordinances meant to protect the public health, safety, morals
and welfare.
In Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove,120 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that an ordinance
banning handguns and other weapons from the northwest suburb was a valid exercise of home rule power.' 2 ' Quilici initially
filed a complaint in state court. The village removed the suit to
110. Id. at 341, 388 N.E.2d at 387.
111. 61 111. 2d 544, 338 N.E.2d 6 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 916 (1976).
112. Id. at 558, 338 N.E.2d at 15.
113. Id. at 552, 338 N.E.2d at 11-12.
114. Id. at 551, 338 N.E.2d at 10-11.
115. 52 Ill. 2d 56, 284 N.E.2d 257 (1972).
116. Id. at 60, 284 N.E.2d at 260.
117. Id. at 59, 284 N.E.2d at 260.
118. 55 Ill. 2d 430, 303 N.E.2d 389 (1973).
119. Id. at 433-36, 303 N.E.2d at 390-92. But see Gilligan v. Korzen, 56 Ill. 2d
387, 308 N.E.2d 613, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 841 (1974) (upholding a similar
wheel tax on motor vehicles in unincorporated Cook County).
120. 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982).
121. Id. at 267-69. The law in question was Ordinance No. 81-11 which
prohibits handguns, any weapon which could discharge eight or more shots
in a single function, bludgeons, blackjacks, metal knuckles, switchblades,
etc. Id. at 263-64 n.1.
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the federal court and consolidated it with two other pending
suits. 1 22 An action for declaratory judgment and permanent injunction against the enforcement of the ordinance was based on
allegations that the ordinance violated the Illinois Constitution 123 and the second, ninth and fourteenth amendments to the
United States Constitution. 124 The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Morton Grove and an appeal
125
followed.
Before reaching the constitutional issue, the appellate court
considered the issue of whether the ordinance was a valid exercise of home rule power. The court analyzed the issue in terms
of the police power and whether the exercise of the police power
violated a constitutionally guaranteed right of an individual to
bear arms. 126 After noting that the State of Illinois did not have
an exclusive interest in gun control, 127 the court upheld the Morton Grove ordinance as a valid exercise of the Village's police
power. 128 Moreover, the court found that Morton Grove's desire
to control handguns within its boundaries was properly aimed at
29
protecting the health and safety of its citizens.
Quilici turned on the issue of exclusive state control over a
specific area of law. The same issue surfaced in City of Carbondale v. Yehling: 130 there, the Illinois Supreme Court was confronted with a city ordinance providing for the condemnation of
real property by eminent domain. The issue arose when the
City of Carbondale filed petitions for condemnation. The
defendants filed motions to dismiss asserting that the city exceeded its home rule authority in passing an eminent domain
ordinance similar to the state statute. 131 The motions to dismiss
were granted. Following this judgment, the court issued an
amended order reaffirming the original order and certified the
132
question of home rule authority to the supreme court.
122. 695 F.2d at 264.
123. ILL. CONST. art. I § 22 (1970).
124. U.S. CONST. amends. II, IX and XIV.
125. 695 F.2d at 265.
126. Id. at 267-69.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 269.
129. Id. at 268-69. The one dissenting judge stated that gun control was
an exclusive state function and that Morton Grove's Ordinance No. 81-11
was an invalid exercise of home rule power. Id. at 271-72 (Coffey, J.,
dissenting).
2d 495, 451 N.E.2d 837 (1983).
130. 96 Ill.
131. Id.
132. City of Carbondale v. Yehling, 96 Ill. 2d 495, 451 N.E.2d 837 (1983). In

all, eight cases were involved; all were dismissed.
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The argument made by the parties seeking to invalidate the
ordinance was based on the existence of a state law. The parties
argued that the state law served as proof that the state had an
overriding interest in property law and, therefore, the home rule
unit was precluded from regulating in that area.1 33 The court
addressed the argument by re-examining the clause "pertaining
to its government and affairs."'1 34 First, matters of statewide
35
concern do not "pertain to" the governing of a home rule unit.
The court held that the exercise of eminent domain over property does pertain to the city's government and affairs. Control of
property in this manner does not require uniform laws with
statewide application. Thus, a home rule unit may place such
36
controls on property within its borders.
Despite the court's finding that the subject matter of the
Carbondale ordinance pertained to local government and affairs,
the ordinance was invalidated on other grounds. The court held
that the ordinance was invalid because it prescribed specific judicial procedures. The judiciary is an area of exclusive state
control and not subject to regulation by home rule units. Because the judicial procedures were incorporated into the Carbondale ordinance in a manner which prohibited severance of
the unconstitutional portions, the entire ordinance was declared
37
invalid.
In City of Evanston v. Create, Inc.,138 Evanston passed an
ordinance requiring certain provisions to be included in rental
lease agreements between landlord and tenant. Opponents of
the ordinance claimed that a state statute regulating landlordtenant relations was evidence of the state's intent to retain exclusive control of landlord-tenant laws. 139 The Illinois Supreme
Court stated two reasons for holding the ordinance valid. First,
the landlord-tenant statute did not specifically provide for exclusion of home rule power to regulate that area of law. Further,
although amended many times, the state statute was enacted
prior to the 1970 constitution. The court relied on the rule that a
home rule ordinance will prevail over a conflicting state statute
when the state statute was enacted prior to 1970.140 The second
reason given for validating the ordinance was its limited scope.
The ordinance was confined to rental properties within the city's
133. Id. at 501, 451 N.E.2d at 839.
134. Id.; ILL. CONST. art. VII § 6(a).
135. City of Carbondale v. Yehling, 96 Ill. 2d 495, 451 N.E.2d 837 (1983).

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 501, 451 N.E.2d at 840.
Id. at 504, 451 N.E.2d at 841.
85 Ill. 2d 101, 421 N.E.2d 196 (1981).
Id. at 108, 421 N.E.2d at 199.
Id.
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borders. 14 1 The court also found that the regulation of landlordtenant relations did not require statewide uniformity or exclusivity. 142 For these reasons the landlord-tenant ordinance was
found to pertain to the city's government and affairs.
Six months after the Illinois Supreme Court decided Create,
an Illinois appellate court faced a similar situation. The City of
Belleville v. Kesler 143 raised the question whether a state statute is a manifestation of the state's intent to maintain exclusive
control over a particular area of law. 1' The City of Belleville,
pursuant to its home rule power, enacted an ordinance regulating free standing signs on property located in an area zoned as a
multifamily district. The property owned by the defendant was
originally zoned as commercial and later changed to multifamfly. The sign on the property projected into the public right of
way and encroached on the property line in violation of the ordinance. 4 5 The trial court held that the ordinance was
146
unconstitutional.
On appeal, the defendant argued that the ordinance was in14 7
valid because it was based upon the Illinois Municipal Code.
The court, however, pointed out that the ordinance was passed
pursuant to home rule authority and not a state statute. 14 8 Continuing, the court held that the regulation of signs on private
property pertained to the city's government and affairs because
the ordinance addressed a problem involving the public health,
49
safety and welfare of the residents of Belleville.
The scope of the home rule power to zone was addressed in
Thompson v. Cook County Zoning Board of Appeals.15° The issue presented was whether passage of an amendatory zoning ordinance and the issuance of a special use permit constituted a
proper exercise of home rule power.' 5 1 The court answered in
141. Id. at 112-113, 421 N.E.2d at 199-200.
142. Id. at 114, 421 N.E.2d at 201. The defendants also alleged that the

ordinance interfered with the state judiciary system and substantive contract law. The court held that substantive contract law was not changed and
that a state may impose specific conditions on contracts, pursuant to the
police power, for the public good. Further, the ordinance does not bar the
parties from state courts; therefore, no interference was found. Id. at 115-16,
421 N.E.2d at 202-03.
143. 101 ll. App. 3d 710, 428 N.E.2d 617 (1981).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 712, 428 N.E.2d at 618.
146. Id.
147. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, 11-80-15 (1979).
148. 101 m. App. 3d 710, 713, 428 N.E.2d 617, 618 (1981).
149. Id. at 713, 428 N.E.2d at 620.
150. 96 Ill.
App. 3d 561, 421 N.E.2d 285 (1981).
151. Id. The other issues presented to the court for review were: (1) the
procedural aspects of the Cook County Zoning Board of Appeals in passing
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the affirmative. 152 The appellants contended that the zoning
board approved the ordinance in violation of a state statute regulating state zoning boards. 153 The court disagreed and held
that zoning is a valid exercise of home rule power and pertains
to the local government's affairs. 154 Because Cook County
is a
15 5
home rule unit, it was not bound by the state statute.
Along with ordinances protecting the health, safety and welfare of residents, the Illinois Constitution grants the home rule
unit the power to tax provided such taxes pertain to the local
government and affairs.' 5 6 The Appellate Court for the Second
District balanced the power of the home rule unit to impose a
local tax against the limitations of the state statutes in Elgin National Bank v. Rowcliff.1' 7 The problem in Rowcliff was the disproportionate assessment of taxes upon the plaintiff due to the
exemption of certain charitable and religious organizations and
municipal buildings from the special service area taxes. 5 8 The
distinction made was that these properties were exempt from
taxes by virtue of the state revenue act.1 9 In an earlier decision,
this appellate court held that special taxation for improvements
was not necessariliy revenue and, therefore, those organizations
normally exempt under the revenue act are taxable under the
special service area tax. 160 The question presented was whether
the city council's later exemption of certain properties in accordance with the state statute was a valid exercise of home rule
power. 16 1 Noting that home rule powers must be liberally construed, 162 the court held that where the home rule unit has
power to tax, it also can exempt properties under the state reve163
nue act.
Another appellate court addressed a taxation issue in the
the ordinance; and, (2) the admission of testimony taken before the Board
into evidence.
152. Id.

153. Id. at 567, 421 N.E.2d at 291-92. County Zoning Enabling Act, ILL.
ch. 34, § 3156 (1979).
154. 96 Ill. App. 3d at 569, 421 N.E.2d at 292. See also County of Cook v.
John Sexton Contractors, 75 Ill. 2d 494, 389 N.E.2d 553 (1979); Johnny Bruce
Co. v. Champaign, 24 Ill. App. 3d 900, 321 N.E.2d 469 (1974).
155. 96 Ill. App. 3d at 569, 421 N.E.2d at 292.
156. ILL. CONST. art. VII § 6(a) (1970).
REV. STAT.

157. 109 Ill. App. 3d 719, 441 N.E.2d 112 (1982).

158.
159.
160.
161.

Id. at 721, 441 N.E.2d at 114.
Revenue Act of 1939, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120 §§ 500.1 - 500.23 (1979).
Ciacco v. City of Elgin, 85 Ill. App. 3d 507, 407 N.E.2d 108 (1980).
Elgin Nat'l Bank v. Rowcliff, 109 Ill. App. 3d 719, 441 N.E.2d 112

(1982).

162. Id. at 730, 441 N.E.2d at 119.
163. Id.
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context of revenue bonds. 164 South Barrington, a home rule
unit, passed a resolution to issue revenue bonds to help finance
a Marshall Field retail store in a neighboring town. 165 South
Barrington later withdrew the issuance of the bonds, claiming it
exceeded its constitutional authority under the home rule grant.
The city claimed the bonds were to be used to build a facility
beyond its boundaries. 166 The court analyzed the constitutionality of the bonds in terms of the Industrial Project Revenue Bond
Act.' 67 First, the court noted that the statute grants non-home
rule units authority to finance certain projects within ten miles
of their borders. 68 An earlier supreme court decision held that
home rule units had this power not by virtue of a statute, but by
virtue of the home rule provision of the 1970 constitution. 1 69 Because South Barrington exercised its authority pursuant to
home rule provisions and not the state statute, there was no express legislative limitation on the use of the bonds for industrial
projects rather than retail outlets. 170 The court thus extended
the area that may be encompassed for the issuance of bonds for
a commercial development to a ten mile radius of the home rule
unit's borders.' 7' Where revenue bonds are concerned, the issuance may "pertain to" the local government, even though the
72
use of the bonds falls outside the corporate borders.
Two subjects pertaining to a home rule unit's government
and affairs, but not specifically mentioned in the Illinois Constitution are the establishment of salaries for government officials 173 and the regulation of home rule unit personnel. 174 In
Winokur v. Rosewell, the Cook County Board enacted salary
raises which were vetoed by the County Board President. The
board members overrode the veto and passed appropriations to
finance the raises. The President exercised a partial line veto
75
which reduced the raises provided in the initial resolution.
164. Marshall Field & Co. v. Village of South Barrington, 92 111.App. 3d
360, 415 N.E.2d 1277 (1981).
165. Id. at 361, 415 N.E.2d at 1279.
166. Id. at 362, 415 N.E.2d at 1279. The second issue was whether the
monies would be spent for public use as required by the constitution. Id.
167. Id.

at 364, 415 N.E.2d at 1281. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24,

11-74-4(1)

(1979).
168. 92 Ill. App. 3d at 364, 415 N.E.2d at 1281 (1981).
169. People ex rel. City of Salem v. McMackin, 53 111.2d 347, 291 N.E.2d

807 (1972).

170. 92 Ill.
App. 3d at 365, 415 N.E.2d at 1281.

171. Id.
172. But see supra notes 135-41 and accompanying text.

173. Winokur v. Rosewell, 83 Ill.
2d 92, 414 N.E.2d 724 (1980).
174. Resman v. Personnel Brd. of the City of Chicago, 96 Ill.
App. 3d 919,
422 N.E.2d 120 (1981).
175. 83 Ill. 2d at 94, 414 N.E.2d at 725.
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The Illinois Supreme Court held that the raises were a valid exercise of home rule power and that the home rule power superprocedures for setting the
sedes the state statute regulating the
176
salaries of county board personnel.
Thus, recent Illinois decisions demonstrate the continuing
trend to liberally construe the home rule powers granted by the
1970 Constitution. An emerging issue, however, is whether
home rule powers are limited, in all cases, by the physical
boundaries of the home rule unit.177
III.

LIMITATIONS ON HOME RULE POWERS: JUDICIAL
LIMITATIONS-SUBJECTS NOT PERTAINING

To LOCAL AFFAIRS
A. Background
The Illinois Constitution of 1970 granted home rule municipalities broad powers to cope with problems peculiar to municipal and county government. 178 The basic grant of power in
section 6(a) contains two parts. 1 79 The first part is a grant of
general authority which states that "a home rule unit may exercise any power and perform any function pertaining to its government and affairs ......,,180 The second part is a grant of four
basic powers which are "the power to regulate for the protection
of the public health, safety, morals and welfare; to license; to
tax; and to incur debt."' 8'
The terms of this grant are broad 182 and are to be given a
liberal construction. 18 3 The grant, however, is not a grant of
sovereignty upon the home rule unit. 184 The home rule unit's
power only extends to those powers pertaining to its government and affairs. 185 There is no precise definition of "local affairs"'18 6 or "state affairs."'1 87 The attempt to define these terms
176. Id. see Counties Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 34 304 (1977).
177. See supra notes 155-62, and accompanying text.
178. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(a) (1970).
179. Kratovil and Ziegwald, Illinois Home Rule and UrbanLand - A Test
Run of the New Constitution, 22 DE. PAUL L. REV. 359, 362 (1972).
180. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(a).

181. Id.
2d 537, 539, 338 N.E.2d 15, 17 (1975).
182. Ampersand, Inc. v. Finley, 61 Ill.
183. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(m). See Baum, A Tentative Survey of Illinois
Home Rule (PartI): Powers and Limitations, 1972 U. ILL. L. F. 137, 157.
184. Michael and Norton, Home Rule in Illinois: A FunctionalAnalysis,
1978 U. ILL. L. F. 559, 601-02.
185. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(a). See Michael and Norton, supra note 183,
at 601 (discusses the grant and limitations imposed by section 6(a)).
2d 537, 539, 338 N.E.2d 15, 17
186. See Ampersand, Inc. v. Finley, 61 Ill.
(1975) (almost impossible to define the term municipal affairs). See also
Krativol and Ziegwald, supra note 178, at 366.
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is further complicated by the rapidly changing character of urban society. 188 The grant of home rule, necessarily, leaves an
area of uncertainty as to the scope of authority vested in municipalities. 189 It has been left to the courts to distinguish a "local
affair" from a "state affair." This distinction often is the crucial
factor in determining the extent of authority granted to a home
rule municipality under section 6(a). 190
The Local Government Committee of the Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention, 19 1 recalling the problems of judicial preemption experienced in other states, 192 attempted to minimize
the potential judicial construction of the home rule unit's scope
of authority. 193 Nevertheless, several commentators, because of
the uncertainty in Illinois' constitutional grant of home rule
powers, recognized and feared the judiciary's potential power to
undermine the legislature's intent to grant broad powers to local
governments. 94 Regardless of these restraints and reservations, it necessarily falls upon the courts to distinguish matters
195
of local concern from matters of state concern.
Since home rule's implementation, the courts have attempted to define the parameters of the phrase "pertaining to
local government and affairs." In defining these parameters, the
courts have determined that certain subject matter does not pertain to local affairs and government. In reaching these determi187. See Van Gilder v. City of Madison, 222 Wis. 58, 67, 267 N.W. 25, 28
(1936) (term "statewide concern" is practically undefinable). See also
Kratovil and Ziegwald, supra note 178, at 366.
188. See Vanlandingham, Symposium: Problems in ConstitutionalLaw
- Municipal Home Rule in the United States, 10 WM. & MARY L. REV. 269,
291 (1968).
189. Kratovil and Ziegwald, supra note 178, at 385.
190. See id. at 366-68.
191. The committee was the basic working unit which conducted hearings, made proposals and prepared the home rule provision of the Illinois
Constitution. Anderson and Lousin, From Bone Gap to Chicago: A History
of the Local Government Article of the 1970 Illinois Construction, 9 J. MArt J.
PRAc. & Pnoc. 697, 708 (1976) (contains a comprehensive biography of the
committee members and a history of the committee proceedings).
192. Committee Proceedings, Vol. IV at 3053. See also Biebel, Home Rule
in Illinois After Two Years: An UncertainBeginning, 6 J. MAR. J. PRAC. &
PRoc. 253, 282 (1973) (discussion of implied presumption's adverse effect on
home rule in Texas, California and Ohio).
193. The effort to minimize the problem of judicial implied preemption
was the reason sections 6(g), (h) and (i) were drafted into the home rule
provision. See Vitullo, Local Government: Recent Developments in Local
Government Law in Illinois, 22 DE PAuL L. REV. 85, 91 (1972). See also
Biebel, supra note 191, at 283; Baum, supra note 182, at 157.
194. Biebel, supra note 191, at 262-63 (citing Baum, supra note 182, at
152). This commentator asserted that the key to effective home rule is the
successful restraint of the courts' power to preempt a home rule unit's authority. Id. at 282.
195. See Michael and Norton, surpa note 181, at 568.
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nations, the courts have struggled to find a standard when
reviewing a home rule unit's expression of control over a subject. The courts initially focused on the question of whether the
local authority was expressly or impliedly preempted by a state
statute. 196 These early decisions were criticized because the
courts' reasoning had the potential for severly limiting the scope
of a home rule unit's authority. 197 Later cases, however, shifted
the focus from the preemption question to the question of
whether the matter regulated "pertained to" the home rule
unit's government and affairs. 198 This shift in focus aligns the
courts' scope of review with that intended by the framers. 199 A
review of the pre-1980 cases illustrates the courts' struggle to establish a test in which to sort out what subjects are either within
or without the local affairs category. 200 This review attempts to
identify how the courts analyze a given question within this area
as an aid in giving some predictability to what is not within the
ambit of local affairs. 20 1 Generally, the court holds that affairs
are not within the ambit of a home rule unit when: (1) the subject matter is an area of law traditionally governed by the state,
and (2) the home rule unit's exercise of power has an impact
20 2
beyond its borders.
In the cases where the court found that a traditional state
interest preempted local regulation, the primary factors in
reaching that conclusion were whether a unified system was
contemplated, 20 3 whether the matter regulated was of statewide
concern, 20 4 and whether the state had a dominant interest in
regulating the matter. 205 If these questions were answered af196. See Bridgman v. Korzen, 54 Ill. 2d 74, 295 N.E.2d 9 (1972).
197. Biebel, supra note 191 at 314.
198. See Carlson v. Briceland, 61 Ill. App. 3d 120, 377 N.E.2d 1138 (1978)
(court held home rule intended to reverse presumption against local
authority).
199. Anderson and Lousin, supra note 190, at 747 ("Courts could check
the power of a home rule unit only by narrowly interpreting the powers and
functions pertaining to its government and affairs.").
200. See supra notes 194-95 and accompanying text. See also Kratovil
and Ziegwald, supra note 178, at 367.
201. See id.
202. Michael and Norton, supra note 183, at 568-69. See also Metropolitan
Sanitary Dist. v. City of Des Plaines, 63 Ill. 2d 256, 347 N.E.2d 716 (1976) (ap-

plication of city ordinance to a regional sewage system was not within the
grant of home rule powers). City of Des Plaines v. Chicago and Nw. Ry. Co.,
65 Ill. 2d 1, 357 N.E.2d 433 (1976) (regulation of noise pollution is a matter of

state concern because it extends beyond borders of the municipality.
203. People ex rel. Lignoul v. City of Chicago, 67 Ill. 2d 480, 368 N.E.2d 100
(1977); Ampersand, Inc. v. Finley, 61 Ill. 2d 537, 338 N.E.2d 15 (1975).
204. Id.
205. People v. Valentine, 50 Ill. App. 3d 447, 365 N.E.2d 1082 (1977) (criminal identification and investigation).
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firmatively, the matter was a "state affair" and not within the
ambit of the home rule unit. The analysis of several cases illustrates this point.
In People ex rel Lignoul v. City of Chicago,206 a city passed
an ordinance allowing branch banking. The Illinois Supreme
Court held that, due to the pervasive state and federal regulation of the area, banking is outside the jurisdiction of home rule
units. 20 7 The Lignoul court found that matters predominantly
regulated by state and national statutes are matters not pertain20 8
ing to local government and affairs.
Similarly, in People v. Valentine,20 9 the court held that an
ordinance governing expungement of arrest records was not a
matter which pertained to local affairs. 210 The court stated that
the expungement provisions of the state statute are concerned
with the right of privacy regardless of residence or place of arrest.2 11 This subject matter has been comprehensively regulated
by the state for many years and is exclusively an area of state
212
regulation.
In Ampersand v. Finley,213 the court addressed a tax imposing a $1.00 fee on the filing of all civil actions in Cook County.
The fee was to be used for the support of the Cook County Law
Library. The court struck down the ordinance imposing the
$1.00 fee because it was an exercise of local control over the
state's court system. The fee was found to be a local attempt to
burden access to the state's judicial system. The court held that
ease of access to the courts should be maintained and that there
was a need for statewide uniformity in the level of accessability
2 14
to the courts.
In other cases the court has also held that home rule units
are without jurisdiction over the administration of justice. 2 15 In
Cummings v. Daley, 216 the Chicago Commission on Human Relations suspended the real estate licenses of a real estate firm,
its president and one of its salesmen. They had been charged
with violations of Chicago's Fair Housing Ordinance. The ordi206. 67 Ill.
2d 480, 368 N.E.2d 100 (1977).

207. Id. at 485-86, 368 N.E.2d at 103-04.
208. Id. at 484-85, 368 N.E.2d at 103.

209. 50 IlM. App. 3d 447, 365 N.E.2d 1082 (1977).
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
N.E.2d
216.

Id. at 450-51, 365 N.E.2d at 1085.
Id.
Id. at 450-51, 365 N.E.2d at 1085.
61 Ill.
2d 537, 338 N.E.2d 15 (1975).
Id. at 541-42, 338 N.E.2d at 18.
Nowicki v. Evanston Fair Housing Review Bd., 62 Ill. 2d 11, 338
186 (1975); Cummings v. Daley, 58 Ill. 2d 1, 317 N.E.2d 22 (1974).
58 Ill.
2d 1, 317 N.E.2d 22 (1974).
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nance provided that review would be governed by the Illinois
Administrative Review Act. 2 17 The provision providing review

was challenged and the court held that the methods of review
were of state interest. The court stated that the method of judicial review did not pertain to local government and affairs but
rather, that methods of review were established and maintained
by the state. The court denied any home rule authority to determine the method of judicial review for the unit's administrative
agencies.
These decisions indicate that an ordinance by a home rule
municipality will be declared invalid if it invades the province of
purely state affairs. 218 The courts, after finding that a subject
matter is of state concern, have, in several cases, considered
whether the municipality could legislate concurrently with the
state. The court has allowed concurrent regulation by the state
and governmental units in the area of environmental control.
In City of Chicago v. Pollution Control Board,2 19 the Illinois
Environmental Protection Agency and the Illinois Pollution'
Control Board appealed an order enjoining them from enforcing
the Illinois Environmental Protection Act against the City of
Chicago. The court held that Chicago must comply with the provisions of the state act. 220 The court noted that the legislature

did not express an intention to completely exclude local regulatory efforts in the field of environmental law. The court concluded that a municipal unit may legislate concurrently,
provided the local ordinance conforms with the minimum standards established by the legislature. 22 1 It is important to note
that when concurrent legislation is allowed the state has superior authority in case of a conflict between the home rule unit
222
and the state.
The decision permitting concurrent legislation in the area of
environmental control was not completely settled after Pollution
Control Board.223 In Carlson v. Village of Worth, 2 24 the court
held that local regulation of a sanitary landfill was preempted by
217. Id. at 3, 317 N.E.2d at 23.
218. See supra notes 202-04 and accompanying text. See also Kratovil

and Ziegwald, supra note 178 at 370.

219. 59 Ill. 2d 484, 322 N.E.2d 11 (1974).
220. Id. at 486, 322 N.E.2d at 13.
221. Id. at 489, 322 N.E.2d at 14.
222. Minetz, Recent Illinois Supreme Court Decisions concerning the Authority of Home Rule Units to ControlLocal EnvironmentalProblems, 26 DE
PAUL L. REV. 306, 312 (1977).
223. 59 Ill. 2d 484, 322 N.E.2d 11 (1974).
224. Carlson v. Village of Worth, 62 Ill. 2d 406, 343 N.E.2d 496 (1975) (a
non-home rule municipality sought to regulate a sanitary landfill).
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the Environmental Protection Act. 225 The court stated that Pollution Control Board's conclusion that a local governmental unit
may legislate concurrently with the General Assembly was dictum. 2 2 6 The court, in later cases firmly established the principle
that the local home rule unit and the General Assembly may
legislate environmental matters concurrently in an exact, defi227
nite area wholly within a home rule unit's boundaries.
In cases where a home rule unit's ordinance has an extraterritorial impact, the court does not consider whether the local
unit could legislate concurrently. 228 In these cases, the court examines the state statute and determines whether it preempts all
home rule regulation in the area.229 The most significant cases
dealing with the extra-territorial impact of an ordinance have
230
concerned control over environmental pollution matters.
These cases illustrate the courts' development of a method of
analysis in determining whether a subject matter is a "state affair" and does not pertain to "local government and affairs."
In Metropolitan SanitaryDistrictv. City of Des Plaines,231 a
home rule municipality sought to regulate a regional sanitation
authority's construction and operation of a sewage treatment
plant. The city required a regional district to acquire a city permit and to comply with city health ordinances. The sanitary district had a state EPA permit and contended that its compliance
with state standards was sufficient. The court held that waste
disposal was inherently a matter of state concern and that state
standards preempt the field leaving no opportunity for local regulation. 232 The court's reasoning was based on the regional nature of a sanitary district and the unacceptability of subjecting
regional entities to a plethora of municipalities and their
regulations.
In City of Des Plaines v. Chicago and Northwestern Railway
Co. ,233 the supreme court invalidated a city noise ordinance because it found that environmental problems were outside the
grant of authority conferred on home rule units by section
225. Id. at 409, 343 N.E.2d at 500.
226. Id.
227. E.g., County of Cook v. John Sexton Contractors Co., 75 Ill. 2d 494,
389 N.E.2d 553 (1979) (court allowed concurrent legislation); Carlson v.
Briceland, 61111. App. 3d 120, 377 N.E.2d 1138 (1978) (court held local governmental units may legislate concurrently with state).
228. See Michael and Norton, surpa note 183, at 569.
229. See County of Cook v. John Sexton Contractors Co., 75 Ill. 2d 494, 389
N.E.2d 553 (1979).
230. See Michael and Norton, supra note 7, at 569.
231. 63 Ill. 2d 256, 347 N.E.2d 716 (1976).
232. Id. at 259, 347 N.E.2d at 720.
233. 65 Ill. 2d 1, 357 N.E.2d 433 (1976).
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The court applied the first step of the analysis introduced in Metropolitan Sanitary District and likewise did not
need to reach the preemption question. 235 The court reasoned
that noise pollution was a concern but is essentially a matter
requiring regional or statewide standards and control. 236 The
court compared noise pollution with air and water pollution.
The court noted that all three may emanate from a local source
but all have the potential to travel well beyond their sources.
The city, therefore, intended to control emissions originating beyond its boundaries, as well as those within its boundaries.
These cases support the view that home rule units may not
regulate environmental matters which have an extra-territorial
effect on other municipalities. These matters do not pertain to
local affairs but are of a statewide or regional concern. State
affairs, traditionally "recognized as falling within the competence of the state rather than local authorities," do not pertain to
local affairs and are also outside the ambit of home rule regulation.237 The court, giving a liberal construction to the grant of
home rule power, has allowed concurrent legislation wholly
within a home rule unit's boundaries, it if is not an area traditionally or expressly a state affair.
6(a).234

B. Recent Developments
Since 1979, the issue of when a municipal enactment does
not "pertain to its government and affairs" has generally been
analyzed under the traditional approach: is the matter acted
upon one of state-wide concern, 238 or does the enactment have
an impact beyond the territorial borders of the home rule
unit. 239 Perhaps the most terse, yet thorough analysis of the issue appeared in a 1980 opinion of the Illinois Attorney General.24 ° The City of Des Plaines, a home rule unit, had passed an
ordinance which provided that unclaimed property shall escheat
to the city. 24 1 The Attorney General's opinion stated that Illinois has two separate statutory provisions that regulate the disposition of unclaimed or abandoned property. 242 The Attorney
General reasoned that the Des Plaines ordinance would have a
234. Id. at 4-6, 357 N.E.2d at 435.

235. Id.
236. Id.
237. See supra notes 205-217 and accompanying text.
238. People v. Valentine, 50 Ill. App. 3d 447 (1977).
239. Bridgeman v. Korzen, 54 Ill. 2d 74 (1972).
240. Atty. Gen. Op. S-1498 (July 7, 1980).
241. Id.
242. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 49, 1 et seq. (1979) (property of person who dies
without heirs escheats to county of residence); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 141, $ 101
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"substantial impact on the state" 243 and therefore did not pertain to its government and affairs because of the "clear" intrusion upon a traditional power of the state. Also, property that
escheats to the city might be property that would otherwise escheat to the county under Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 49, 1, et seq. (1939).
The ordinance thus has an effect and impact on the affairs of
other governmental units 2 44 and is consequently not an appro245

priate area for city regulation.
There have been two other cases of interest that held invalid
municipal ordinances under a "state-wide" concern analysis. In
McLorn v. City of East St. Louis,246 the appellate court held invalid an ordinance prohibiting the non-wage garnishment of the
city's funds that were on deposit in institutions within the
city. 24 7 The court initially reasoned that the ordinance conet seq (1979) (abandoned property escheats to State Director of Financial
Institutions).
243. Atty. Gen. Op. at 96. (S-1498).
244. In cases involving an extraterritorial impact or effect, it has been
suggested that the analysis should use a weighing process that balances the
extraterritorial impact and the interests if the home rule unit is the subject
matter of the enactment. Michael E. Norton, supra note 183, at 572. This
balancing approach was used in Carlson v. Briceland, 61 Ill.
App. 3d 247, 377
N.E.2d 1138 (1978).
245. In 1982, the Attorney General issued two opinions regarding the possible validity of a proposed gambling casino ordinance, Opinion of Attorney
General, 82-036 (Oct. 22, 1982) and an ordinance governing the care and disposal of public records related to the corporate function of the city. Opinion
of Attorney General, 82-054 (December 14, 1982). In both cases, there exists
state statutes that specifically covered the attempted actions. ILL. REv.
STAT. ch. 116, 43.101 et seq. (1981) (The Local Records Act); ILL. REV. STAT.

ch. 38,

28-1 and 28-3 (1981) (sections of 1961 Criminal Code that define

"gambling," "gambling place" and the possible criminal penalties). In both
cases the Attorney General stated that the proposed ordinances would conflict with the state statutes. The opinions stated that the proposed matters
were of essentially a state concern and that the supremacy of state law deprived the home rule unit from being able to regulate these areas. Thus,
maintenance of public records of local governments and the establishment
and operation of a gambling casino were not matters that pertained to the
government and affairs of the municipalities and therefore not an appropriate area of home rule regulation.
246. 105 111.App. 3d 148, 434 N.E.2d 44 (1982).
247. The ordinance provided:
HOME RULE ORDINANCE TO GRANT IMMUNITY TO THE PROPERTY AND ASSETS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL UNITS AND
SCHOOL DISTRICTS FROM SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEEDINGS
INSTITUTED BY JUDGMENT CREDITORS AND THEIR
SUCCESSORS.
WHEREAS, the City of East St. Louis is a 'Home Rule Municipality' under the provisions of Article VII, Section 6-a, etc., of the Illinois
State Constitution and was adopted in 1970; and
WHEREAS, the legislature of the State of Illinois has not enacted
any statutes dealing with or granting sovereign immunity as to supplementary proceedings relating to local units of government, including
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ferred sovereign immunity on the city in direct conflict with article XIII of the Illinois Constitution 248 because it essentially
excluded "City funds from the reach of creditors" 249 and implicated the institution of banking by the city. As an alternative,
the court relied on Ampersand, Inc. v. Finley250 to conclude that
municipalities, school districts, park districts, etc., as was reserved to
said legislature in Article XIII, Section 4 of the Illinois State Constitution; and
WHEREAS, it would be within the purview of the City of East St.
Louis to enact legislation dealing with the issue of immunity of local
governmental units and school districts from supplementary proceedings initiated by judgment creditors and their successors as such proceedings would occur and/or effect [sic I such local governmental units
and school districts situated within the geographical boundaries and
municipal corporate limits of the City of East St. Louis; and
WHEREAS, it would be in the best interest of the City and its citizens and the local governmental units, including school districts, park
districts, sewer districts, and health districts, to be granted immunity
by such actions of judgment creditors as it relates to the property of
such entities situated within the geographical boundaries of the City of
East St. Louis.
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED BY THE MAYOR AND
THE ALDERMANIC COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF EAST ST. LOUIS,
as follows:
I. All property or assets of local governmental units, including municipalities, school districts, park districts and sewer districts, shall be
immune and shall not be subject to garnishment actions by judgment
creditors where said property or asset is held or disposited [sic] with
any third party, or situated within the geographical boundaries and city
limits of the City of East St. Louis.
II. Any institution, firm, trust, person or corporate entity situated
within the city limits of the City of East St. Louis, upon which a judgment creditor issues a garnishee summons on any property or any local
governmental unit, shall be empowered to affirmatively plead the immunity granted in the preceding paragraph I.
III. Any local governmental unit, upon whose property has been
subject to a garnishee summons with any third party institution referred to in Section 1 and/or 2 of this Ordinance, shall have the right to
intercede as a party of interest to any such garnishment proceedings
and to affirmatively plead the immunity granted in Section I of this Ordinance.
IV. Garnishment process, as defined and intended within the provisions of this Ordinance, shall not include wage deduction summons
upon local governmental units situated within the geographical limits
of the City of East St. Louis.
Id. at 150-51, 434 N.E.2d at 45-6.
248. ILL. CONST. art. XIII. Section 4 of article XII provides: "Except as
the General Assembly may provide by law, sovereign immunity in the State
is abolished."
249. McLorn, 105 Ill. App. 3d at 152, 434 N.E.2d at 47. Also, the preamble
to the ordinance itself implicated the attempted exercise of sovereign immunity. As quoted by the court, that part of the preamble reads:
"[W] hereas, the legislature of the State of Illinois has not enacted any statutes dealing with or granting sovereign immunity as to supplementary proceedings relating to local units of government. .. " Id. at 150, 434 N.E.2d at
45.
250. 61 Ill.
2d 537, 338 N.E.2d 15 (1975).
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the ordinance in question did not pertain to the city's government and affairs. The court reasoned that a state-wide interest
exists when state constitutional provisions commit areas in
question to a branch of state government.25 1 Consequently,
since the ordinance in question conferred sovereign immunity
on the city, a power reserved to the General Assembly under
section 4 of article XIII of the 1970 constitution, the city was attempting to exercise a power held by the state. The existence of
a "state-wide interest" in the institution of banking relegated
the city's ordinance as one not pertaining to the home rule unit's
25 2
government and affairs and was therefore invalid.
The second case using a "state-wide concern" or interest
analysis is City of Carbondalev. Yehling 25 3 In Yehling, the city
passed an eminent domain ordinance similar to the Eminent
Domain Act. 254 The city thereafter filed several petitions for
condemnation in the circuit court. The circuit court ultimately
executed a certificate of importance and the supreme court
granted the city's direct appeal motion to determine whether
the city had the right to acquire real property by virtue of the
city's eminent domain ordinance and article VII, section 6 of the
1970 Illinois Constitution. The ordinance in question was passed
by the city to aid its urban redevelopment program. The court
found this concern of the city to be "sufficiently local in character that the city's purpose 'pertain [s to [its I local government
and affairs.' ",255 The court held, however, that enforcement of
the ordinance was an impermissible interference with the state
judicial system.2 56 Because the ordinance purported "to define
the notice procedures of the courts, duties of parties in court,
and specific remedies available in court proceedings," 257 the city
was attempting to outline rules for the state courts to follow - a
matter clearly of a state concern and not one pertaining to the
258
home rule unit's government and affairs.
A 1982 decision of the Illinois Supreme Court, Commercial
National Bank of Chicago v. City of Chicago,259 held that that
251. McLorn 105 Il. App. 3d at 153, 434 N.E.2d at 48.
252. Id. at 154, 434 N.E.2d at 48.

253. 96 Il. 2d 495, 451 N.E.2d 837 (1983).
254. ILL.

REV. STAT.

ch. 47,

1 et. seq.

255. Yehling, 96 Ill. 2d at 497, 451 N.E.2d at 837.
256. Id. at 500-01, 451 N.E.2d at 840.
257. Id. at 501, 451 N.E.2d at 840.
258. Id. The court distinguished City of Evanston v. Create, Inc., 85 Ill. 2d
101, 421 N.E.2d 196 (1981) which found that the ordinance there in question
could define notice procedures, duties of the parties and remedies available

because that ordinance did not place any conditions upon access to the
courts of the state.
259. 89 Ill. 2d 45, 432 N.E.2d 227 (1982).
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portion of an ordinance that permitted "taxation upon services
not rendered or performed in the territorial jurisdiction of the
taxing entity" 260 was unconstitutional. The court so held because it was not within the power of the city "to define when a
'purchase of service is in the City' or 'substantially performed'
'26 1
so as to give extra-territorial effect to its taxing ordinance.
The definition was in derogation of the territorial limitation imposed on home rule powers under section 6(a) of article VII of
262
the 1970 Illinois Constitution.
IV.

LEGISLATIVE PREEMPTION OF HOME RULE UNDER ARTICLE

VII SECTION

6(g),(h)

AND (i).

A. Background
The powers and authority granted to home rule units by the
Illinois Constitution are not without limit by the state. It was
recognized at the Constitutional Convention that although the
object of article VII, section 6 was to increase local autonomy,
the state had to retain constitutional authority to preempt the
exercise of home rule in order to maintain a proper balance between local authority and legitimate state interests. 263 The preemption scheme embodied in section 6(g), (h), and (i) gives the
Illinois General Assembly the authority to limit or deny the
powers and functions of home rule units. These sections provide three separate and distinct preemption devices.
Section 6(g) contains two concepts. First, the General Assembly may deny or limit the power of a home rule unit to tax
only by a three-fifths vote of each house. The taxing power of
260. Id. at 78, 432 N.E.2d at 243.
261. Id. at 79, 432 N.E.2d at 243.
262. Id. The relevant portion of that ordinance reads as follows:
Section 200.5-3 ....
A purchase of service is in the City if either (a) the
purchaser is in the City at the time the service is provided, or (b) the

seller is in the City at the time the service is provided, and (c) the service is substantially performed, rendered, provided, and received or used
in the City. A service shall be deemed substantially performed, rendered or provided in the City if 50% or more of the work performed or of
the cost incurred by the seller in connection therewith occurs within
the City; a service shall be deemed substantially received or used in the
City if 50% or more of the benefits thereof are realized by the purchaser
in the City.
Id. at 76-77, 452 N.E.2d at 242.
263. SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTrrTIONAL CONVENTION, COMMITTEE ON LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, COMMITTEE REPORT 37-40 (hereinafter cited as LOCAL GovERNMENT REPORT), 7 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS SIXTH ILLINOIS CONsTrruTIONAL CONVENTION, 1611-14 (hereinafter cited as PROCEEDINGS).
See

Baum, A Tentative Survey of Illinois Home Rule (PartII): Legislative Control, Transition Problems,and Intergovernmental Conflict, 1972 U. ILL. L.F.

559, 561 (hereinafter cited as Baum, Part 11).
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home rule units was viewed at the Constitutional Convention as
fundamental to raising the financial resources necessary to local
automony.26 4 The state can restrict or deny that fundamental
power only through the extraordinary means of a three-fifths
vote of each house. The second preemption device in section
6(g) provides that in areas where the state does not exercise any
power, the legislature may deny or limit any power or function
265
of a home rule unit, except special assessments and taxes,
only by a three-fifths vote of each house. The rationale behind
this preemption device is that where the state has not acted in
an area, the General Assembly should not prevent home rule
units from acting unless the state's interest is so great as to war2 66
rant a three-fifth majority.
Where the state has not acted in a particular area, preemption of home rule in that area must proceed under section 6(g).
The different preemption methods of sections 6(h) and (i) apply
where the state is in fact acting in an area. Section 6(h) provides that the General Assembly, by a simple majority, may specifically legislate exclusive exercise by the state of any power or
function of a home rule unit, except the special assessments and
taxes in section 6(1). Section 6(h) does not specifically declare
that the state must be acting in an area before exclusivity can be
legislated under that section. The implication, however, from
sections 6(g) and (h) is that section 6(g) applies where the state
is not acting, and section 6(h) applies where the state does exercise some authority. 267 The rationale of section 6(h) is that state
action in an area is evidence of a greater state interest than nonaction and thus warrants preemption by only a simple majority
rather than the three-fifths requirement of section 6(g).
Section 6(i) provides that home rule units may exercise any
power or perform any function concurrently with the state; to
the extent that the legislature does not specifically limit or specifically declare the state's action as exclusive. Section 6(i), unlike section 6(h), provides for partial preemption by the General
264. LOCAL GOVERNMENT REPORT, supra note 263, at 65-67; PROCEEDINGS,
supra note 263, at 1639-41. See also ILLINOIS INSTITUTE OF CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, Illinois Municipal Law, § 22.52, at 50 (1982) (hereinafter
cited as I.I.C.L.E. Municipal Law). The power to raise revenue was important enough to give it the protection of the three-fifths vote requirement. Id.

265. Section 6(1) states that the General Assembly may not deny or limit
the power of home rule units to make local improvements by special assessments or to levy or impose taxes to provide for special services. ILL. CONST.
Art. VII, § 6(1) (1970). It is not clear why this exception was added to the
preemption package. For a discussion of 6(1), see Baum, Part II, supra
note 263, at 564-66.
266. Baum, Part 11, supra note 263 at 564.
267. See I.I.C.L.E. Municipal Law, supra note 264, § 22.57, at 56.

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 17:613

Assembly. Section 6(i) was designed to restrict, if not completely eliminate, implied preemption of home rule authority by
the courts. 268 The supporters of home rule at the Constitutional
Convention were fearful that if given the opportunity, the courts
would severly restrict home rule authority by reading into legislation an implied, unexpressed, intent to preempt. 269 Section
6(i) seeks to limit the opportunity by the courts to engage in
judicial preemption by flatly stating that unless the state specifically limits or declares exclusivity, home rule units have the
power to regulate concurrently with the state. Thus, the power
to preempt clearly lies with the state legislature, not the courts.
Further, the legislature can only preempt according to the manner set out in sections 6(g), (h), and (i).
The Illinois Supreme Court has consistently held that ordinances enacted pursuant to the grant of home rule powers in
section 6 will prevail over any conflicting state statute enacted
before 1970.270 In reaching this conclusion, the court has focused on two factors. First, section 9 of the Illinois Constitutional Transition Schedule provides that those laws passed prior
to 1970, and are not inconsistent with the constitution, remain in
effect. 271 Second, intent to preempt home rule before 1970 could
not possibly exist because home rule had not been granted until
268. See Baum, A Tentative Sorvey of Illinois Home Rule (PartI): Legislative Control, TransitionProblems and IntergovernmentalConflict, 1972 U.

ILL. L.F. 559, 571-72.
269. LOCAL GOVERNMENT REPORT, supra note 263, at 71; PROCEEDINGS,
supra note 263, at 1654.
270. Town of Cicero v. Fox Valley Trotting Club, Inc., 65 111. 2d 10, 357
N.E.2d 1118 (1976) (state regulation of horse racing industry does not preempt home rule unit's admission tax at local race track); Stryker v. Village
of Oak Park, 62 Ill. 2d 523, 343 N.E.2d 919 (1976) (home rule ordinance
prevails over statute concerning the appointment of police and fire officials); Paglini v. Police Bd., 61 Ill. 2d 233, 335 N.E.2d 480 (1975) (statute
which requires a hearing only before the police board does not preempt
home rule ordinance authorizing a hearing before non-board members);
Mulligan v. Dunne, 61 Ill. 2d 544, 338 N.E.2d 6 (1975) (state regulation of liquor industry does not preempt home rule authority to impose retail tax on
alcohol); Peters v. City of Springfield, 57 Ill. 2d 142, 311 N.E.2d 107 (1974)
(upheld ordinance reducing retirement age of city fire and policement
which conflicted with state retirement age); Clarke v. Village of Arlington
Heights, 57 Ill. 2d 50, 309 N.E.2d 576 (1974) (Illinois Municipal Code does not
preempt home rule authority to alter form of government and provide for
selection and terms of office of municipal officials); People ex rel. Hanrahan
v. Beck, 54 Ill. 2d 561, 301 N.E.2d 281 (1973) (upheld home rule ordinance
that created new municipal office in conflict with statute); Kanellos v.
County of Cook, 53 Ill. 2d 161, 290 N.E.2d 240 (1972) (upheld home rule unit's
bond issue which conflicted with state statute which mandated approval of
such an issue by referendum).
271. ILL. CONST. TRANSITION SCHEDULE § 9 (1970).
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the 1970 constitution.27 2 The court has found that because the
pre-1970 legislation could not have the required intent to limit
home rule, that legislation was inconsistent with the constitution and could not preempt a home rule unit's exercise of its
2 73
powers or functions.
It has been argued that a comprehensive legislative scheme
alone can preempt a home rule unit's actions. 274 The trend in
the cases is otherwise. The Illinois Supreme Court has upheld
ordinances which conflict with comprehensive state legislation
involving the power to tax, 275 age standards for pension benefits,
state control over the liquor industry, 276 and state control over
the form of police board hearings. 27 7 There is, however, a curious and confusing line of cases concerning the Illinois Environmental Protection Act. 278 These cases have found at least
partial preemption of home rule authority based on the comprehensive nature of the pre-1970 statute. 279 The most recent case,
County of Cook v. John Sexton ContractorsCo. ,280 has resolved
some of the confusion in this area. In Sexton, the Illinois
Supreme Court held that the home rule unit could act concurrently with the state on environmental matters, but any home
rule action must conform with the uniform standards set by the
state.28 ' The court's reasoning did not rest on the judicial doctrine of implied preemption based on the comprehensive nature
of the statutue. 282 The court first looked to the "pertaining to"
language of article 7, section 6(a). It found that the environmental regulation in the local ordinance was "sufficiently local in
272.

Kanellos v. County of Cook, 53 Ill. 2d 161, 166-67, 290 N.E.2d 240, 243-

44 (1972).
273. Id. See generally Note, The "Clean Slate Doctrine"; A Liberal Construction of the Scope of the Illinois Home Rule Powers- Kanellos v. County
of Cook, 23 DE PAUL.L. REV. 1298 (1974).
274. Illinois Liquor Comm'n v. City of Joliet, 26 Ill.
App. 3d 27, 32, 324
N.E.2d 453, 457 (1975) (the state can express exclusivity in an area by enacting a comprehensive regulatory scheme). See also Michael & Norton, Home
Rule in Illinois: A FunctionalAnalysis, 1978 U. ILL. L.F. 559, 580-81.
275. Town of Cicero v. Fox Valley Trotting Club, Inc., 65 Ill.
2d 10, 357
N.E.2d 1119 (1976).
276. Peters v. City of Springfield, 57 Ill. 2d 142, 311 N.E.2d 107 (1974); Mulligan v. Dunne, 61 Ill.
2d 544, 338 N.E.2d 6 (1975).
277. Paglini v. Police Bd., 61 Ill.
2d 233, 335 N.E.2d 480 (1975).
278. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, §§ 1001-1051 (1983).
279. City of Des Plaines v. Chicago & N.W.R.R., 65 Ill. 2d 1, 357 N.E.2d 433
(1976); Metropolitan Sanitary Dist. v. City of Des Plaines, 63 Ill.
2d 256, 347
N.E.2d 716 (1976); Carlson v. Village of Worth, 62 Ill.
2d 406, 343 N.E.2d 493
(1975); City of Chicago v. Pollution Control Bd., 59 Ill.
2d 484, 322 N.E.2d 11
(1974); O'Connor v. City of Rockford, 52 Ill.
2d 360, 288 N.E.2d 432 (1972).
280. 75 Ill.
2d 494, 389 N.E.2d 553 (1979).
281. Id. at 514-15, 389 N.E.2d at 560.
282. Id. at 514, 389 N.E.2d at 559.
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character" to be a proper exercise of home rule power. 283 The
home rule unit, however, was not given a free hand by the court
to regulate in any manner it chose. The court relied on the constitutional mandate of article 11. Section 1 of article 11 states
that the public policy of the state is to provide and maintain a
healthful environment. It also states that the General Assembly
shall provide for the implementation and enforcement of that
public policy.284 It was on this basis, not implied preemption,
that the court held that the home rule unit must comply with the
uniform standards set by the state. 285 The Sexton decision is
consistent with decisions in areas other than environmental
control in that it rejects the comprehensive legislature scheme
argument. 286 In these cases, the court is more likely to focus on
the "pertaining to" issue rather than an implied preemption
287
analysis.
Given the specificity requirements in sections 6(h) and (i),
and the mandate of section 6(m), that home rule powers and
functions are to be liberally construed, Illinois courts have given
great deference to home rule ordinances. The supreme court
has repeatedly stated that if the state wishes to preempt, it can
do so under the section 6 preemption sections. The court has
used this as justification fornot rescuing the legislature through
implied preemption. 288 Moreover, the supreme court has held
that the legislation passed after 1970 must specifically declare an
intent to limit or deny home rule. 289 The Illinois General As283. Id. at 508, 389 N.E.2d at 557.
284. Id. at 514, 389 N.E.2d at 559.
285. Id. at 514-15, 389 N.E.2d 560-61. See generally Niro, Illinois Environmental Law- State Preemption of Local Governmental Regulation of Pollution Related Activities, 67 ILL. B.J. 118 (1978); Note, A New Approach to
Home Rule in Illinois-County of Cook v. John Sexton ContractorsCo., 29 DE
PAUL L. REV. 603 (1980); Note, A Balancing Analysis: The Construction of
Illinois Home Rule Powers-County of Cook v. John Sexton ContractorsCompany, 11 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 543 (1980); Note, County of Cook v. John Sexton
Contractors Co.- Home Rule Authority to Regulate the Site of Sanitary
Landfills, 1980 U. ILL. L.F. 505.
286. See Stryker v. Village of Oak Park, 62 Ill. 2d 523, 343 N.E.2d 919
(1976). See also supra notes 275-77 and accompanying text.
287. People ex rel. Lighoul v. City of Chicago, 67 Ill.
2d 480, 368 N.E.2d 100
(1977) (struck down city ordinance concerning branch banking because it
did not pertain to the city's government or affairs).
288. See, e.g., Paper Supply Co. v. City of Chicago, 57 Ill.
2d 553, 317
N.E.2d 3 (1974) (local employer's expense tax upheld); City of Evanston v.
County of Cook, 53 Ill. 2d 312, 291 N.E.2d 823 (1972) (tax enacted by home
rule county not preempted by similar tax by municipality).
289. City of Rockford v. Gill, 75 Ill.
2d 334, 341, 388 N.E.2d 384, 387 (1979);
Rozner v. Korshak, 55 Ill.
2d 430, 435, 303 N.E.2d 389, 392 (1973). Accord Aurora Pizza Hut, Inc. v. Hayter, 79 Ill. App. 3d 1102, 1108, 398 N.E.2d 1150, 1155
(1979); Village of Hoffman Estates v. Union Oil, 56 Ill.
App. 3d 52, 56, 370
N.E.2d 1304, 1307 (1977).
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sembly has also enacted "An Act to revise the law in relation to
the construction of statutes. '290 In essence the statute states
that no law enacted after January 12, 1977 denies or limits any
power or function of a home rule unit unless there is a specific
expression of an intent to do SO. 29 1 The statute, in no uncertain
terms, seeks to reduce the role the judiciary may play in striking
down home rule ordinances.
The Supreme Court has considered other problem areas
concerning statutes passed after 1970. Section 6(g) does not
contain the specificity requirements of sections 6(h) and (i).
The court has held that a law passed by a three-fifths vote in
each house must specifically express an intent to limit or deny
or it does not preempt home rule power.292 Accordingly, not
every bill passed by a three-fifths majority will effectively preempt home rule because the court has read into section 6(g) a
requirement that the legislative intent to preempt must be specific. The court's holding predates the "Act in relation to the
construction of statutes," and that Act should eliminate any fur293
ther problems in this area.
The Illinois Supreme Court has also considered the situation where the legislature has expressed state exclusivity under
section 6(h) but passes a less than comprehensive state program. In United Private Detective and Security Ass'n v. City of
Chicago,294 the court held that this situation preempts the entire area from home rule activity. Even though the state's program was less than all encompassing, the court found complete
preemption. While the court apparently will not engage in any
widespread implied preemption, where the legislature has
passed preemption legislation in accordance with the constitution, the court will uphold the state's preemption against chal2 95
lenges by the home rule unit.
As previously mentioned, the case law on preemption of
home rule powers reveals a remarkable deference to have rule
authority. The drafters of the constitution sought to reduce the
290. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1, § 1101 (1983).
291. Id. For a list of preemption statutes enacted by the Illinois General
Assembly see I.I.C.L.E. Municipal law, supra note 264, at § 22.56, p. 54-55.
292. Rozner v. Korshak, 55 Ill.
2d 430, 303 N.E.2d 389 (1973).
293. The Act states that any legislation seeking to limit home rule pursuant to sections 6(g), (h), (i), (j) or (k) must be specific. ILL.REV. STAT. ch. 1,

§ 1106 (1982).
294. 62 111. 2d 506, 343 N.E.2d 453 (1976).
295. Andruss v. City of Evanston, 68 Ill.
2d 215, 369 N.E.2d 1258 (1977)
(state preempted home rule authority to license and regulate real estate
brokers); Prudential Ins. Co. v. City of Chicago, 66 Ill.
2d 437, 362 N.E.2d 1021
(1977) (state preempted home rule authority to license, regulate and tax
insurance industry).
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role of the courts in deciding preemption of home rule issues,
and they have been successful. It is the General Assembly's
prerogative to preempt home rule powers or functions. If it does
not do so in the constitutionally prescribed manner, the Illinois
Supreme Court has shown little willingness to preempt where
the legislature has not.
B. Recent Developments
In a recent Illinois appellate court case, Mandarino v. Village of Lombard,296 the analysis used in cases of legislative preemption was set forth in a rather detailed manner. In
Mandarino, the court held that the procedures set forth in the
Illinois Municipal Code, 297 regarding the procedures for appointment and discharge of a police chief, did not preempt a local ordinance giving the Lombard Village Manager the power to fire
the village's police chief. 298 The plaintiff in Mandarino had been
fired as the police chief of the Village of Lombard by the village
manager pursuant to a local ordinance giving the manager the
power to terminate the police chief's employment at will. The
circuit court granted the village's motion for judgment on the
pleadings.
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the local ordinance,
which was adopted by the village of Lombard pursuant to its
home rule powers, was preempted by a provision of the Illinois
Municipal Code covering the same subject matter. However, the
appellate court ruled that the Municipal Code provision did not
preempt the local ordinance. The court cited a plethora of authority to support its holding that "a statute enacted subsequent
to the [1970] Constitution and which purports to limit rule powers must, to that effect, be specific. '299 Furthermore, the court
noted that the legislature has specifically codified the requirement for specific language in the statute to affect a preemption
of home rule powers. 30 0 Since there was no provision in the MuApp. 3d 78, 414 N.E.2d 508 (1980).
296. 92 Ill.
297. ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 24, 1 1-1-1 (1961).

298. Section 2.40.020 of the Lombard Village Code provides that the village manager may hire and fire the police chief at will, without any sort of

App. 3d 78, 414
formal hearing. Mandarino v. Village of Lombard, 92 Ill.
N.E.2d 508, 510 (1980).
App. 3d 78, 81, 414 N.E.2d 508, 510 (1980). The Illi299. Mandarino, 92 Ill.
nois Supreme Court cases cited as authority for the rule requiring a specific
2d 334, 338 N.E.2d
preemption provision are: City of Rockford v. Gill, 75 Ill.
2d 523, 343 N.E.2d 919 (1976);
384 (1979); Stryker v. Village of Oak Park, 62 Ill.

Mulligan v. Dunne, 61111. 2d 544, 338 N.E.2d 6 (1975); Rozner v. Korshak, 55
Ill. 2d 430, 303 N.E.2d 389 (1973).

300. Section 1106 of the Construction of Statutes Act specifically provides
that
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nicipal Code specifically limiting the exercise of home rule powers in this area, the court ruled that the statute did not preempt
the local ordinance.
The Mandarino court refused to apply the "comprehensive
statutory scheme" analysis wherein the comprehensive nature
of the legislation is used to indicate legislative intent to preempt
local ordinances. Under this type of analysis, comprehensive
state legislation may supplant local regulation. The court recognized that this analysis more directly concerns the "pertaining
to its government and affairs" issue under section 6(a). 30 1
Rather than showing legislative intent to preempt local ordinances, the court reasoned that where a state statute sets forth a
comprehensive statutory scheme to regulate an area of statewide concern, the subject matter of the legislation is no longer a
matter that pertains to local government and affairs. Local municipalities, therefore, have no power to regulate because its regulatory powers are limited to areas of local concern. The court
ruled that the procedure for discharge of a police chief is not a
matter of statewide concern and, therefore, local municipalities
with home rule powers may adopt their regulations concerning
30 2
the hiring and firing of police personnel.
The Illinois Supreme Court reiterated its position on preemption in City of Evanston v. Create, Inc..303 In Create, the
court upheld a local ordinance which restricted the types of provisions which may be included in local apartment rental agreements. The ordinance was adopted pursuant to Evanston's
home rule powers and imposed certain conditions upon rental
lease agreements which were more strict than those imposed
under the Illinois statute governing landlord and tenant. 30 4 The
city had sued Create, a local real estate agency which managed
a number of rental properties located in Evanston, to enjoin the
landlord from enforcing certain provisions in its rental agreements which violated the city ordinance. The trial court, finding
[n] o law enacted after Jan. 12, 1977, denied or limits any power or function of a home rule unit, pursuant to paragraphs (g), (h), (i), (j) or (k)
of Section 6 of Article VII of the Illinois Constitution unless there is
specific language limiting or denying the power or function...
REV. STAT., ch. 1, § 1106 (1979).

ILL.

301. See supra notes 1-118 and accompanying text which relates to the
issue of the scope of government affairs under section 6(a), article VII of the
Illinois Constitution of 1970.
302. The Mandarino court cited Stryker v. Village of Oak Park, 62 Ill.
2d
523, 527-28, 343 N.E.2d 919, 922 (1976).
303. 85 Ill.
2d 101, 421 N.E.2d 196 (1981).
304. The Illinois landlord and tenant statutes were revised in 1979 and
are contained in "an Act to revise the law in relation to landlord and tenant", ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 80. § 1, (1979).
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that the rental agreements contained provisions which violated
the ordinance, enjoined Create from enforcing the unlawful 3pro05
visions. Create appealed, and the appellate court affirmed.
Create argued that the recently revised Illinois landlord and
tenant law sets out a comprehensive statutory plan implying a
statewide interest rather than a local matter subject to home
rule authority. As a statewide interest, the defendant argued,
the area was one which precluded local government regulation.
This argument tacitly assumes that an area of statewide concern
can not be concurrently regulated by local governments acting
under home rule power. The court refused to submit to this argument, stating that state regulation and local regulation are not
mutually exclusive. The court noted that, in certain cases,
where the state is acting pursuant to a constitutional mandate,
the local legislation would have to conform with the uniform
standard set by the state legislature. 30 6 However, the court
noted that cases of that sort are rare and the area of landlord
and tenant is not one in which the legislature is acting pursuant
to a constitutional mandate.
In a number of cases cited in Create, the Illinois courts had
held local ordinances invalid as unreasonable exercises of home
rule power. For example, People ex rel. Lignoul v. City of Chicago30 7 was cited for the proposition that statewide concern for
the control of branch banking was so strong that home rule units
were precluded from regulating local branch banking. Thus, it
was argued a strong statewide concern such as landlord and tenant regulation should act to preclude local governments from
regulating in the in the landlord and tenant area. However, as
the court pointed out, branch banking is an area specifically limited to state control by article XIII, section 8 of the 1970 Illinois
Constitution. Again, the state legislature is acting pursuant to a
constitutional mandate, and therefore, the area is one which is
not subject to local regulation. In distinguishing such cases, the
Create court reasoned that in order for a state statute to pre305. City of Evanston v. Create, Inc., 84 Ill. App. 3d 752, 405 N.E.2d 1350

(1950). The appellate court noted that the exercise of home rule powers by
a home rule unit may be limited in one of two ways:
First, the legislature may deny or limit pursuant to sections 6(g) and
6(h). Secondly, the grant of power in 6(a) might be limited by judicial

construction of the phrase 'pertaining to its government and affairs'.
Id. at 756, 405 N.E.2d at 1353. The appellate court then ruled that the ordinance constituted a valid exercise of home rule power since the Illinois
landlord and tenant laws did not specifically preempt this area of regulation

and this area was clearly one of local concern. Id.

306. See, e.g., County of Cook v. John Sexton Contractors Co., 75 Ill. 2d
494, 389 N.E.2d 553 (1979) (area of environmental protection one of constitu-

tional dimension requiring uniform standards set by the general assembly).
307. 67 Ill. 2d 480, 386 N.E.2d 100 (1977).
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empt an ordinance adopted by a home rule unit, the statute
must at least contain a statement to that effect. This is not to
say, however, that there are no judicially imposed constraints on
the home rule powers. As the court clearly stated in Create,
where the home rule unit attempts to regulate in an area beyond
the scope of the grant of home rule power contained in section
6(a), the courts will step in. However, this limitation is based on
the scope of the home rule power and it is not based on any judicial interpretation of an implied legislative intent to preempt as
indicated by a "comprehensive statutory scheme. '30 8 The Create court recognized that the grant of home rule powers was intended to be construed liberally and was not intended to be
subject to judicial interpretation or limitation. To that end, the
court ruled that while the issue of the scope of home rule powers may be subject to judicial interpretation, the courts are not
free to consider legislative intent to preempt unless that intent
is manifested in the form of a specific provision to that effect.
While the Create court's ruling on the issue of preemption is
quite clear, occasionally an appellate court decides a preemption issue based on the comprehensive statutory scheme analysis. 30 9 In a recent case, Hutcheraft v. City of Urbana,310 the
appellate court specifically applied the comprehensive statutory
scheme analysis; determining that a local ordinance adopted
uunder Urbana's home rule power outlawing employment discrimination was preempted by the Illinois Fair Employment
Practices Act 31 ' and the Human Rights Act. 3 12 The court reasoned that if a "statute does not contain specific provisions limiting or denying home rule power, whether through oversight or
otherwise, a court is then called upon to examine the entire statute and to divine the legislative intent." 313 The court then ruled
that the Human Rights Act was quite comprehensive in its
scope and, therefore, the Act preempted local legislation in the
area of discrimination. While the court's reasoning is clearly erroneous in light of the Illinois Supreme Court's ruling in City of
Evanston v. Create, Inc. ,314 the ordinance in question in all likelihood constituted an invalid exercise of home rule power. A
308. See, e.g., Hutchcraft v. City of Urbana, 104 fI1. App. 3d 817, 433 N.E.2d
329 (1982)

(court relied on comprehensive statutory scheme); see infra

notes 309-314 and accompanying text.
309. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
310. 104 Ill. App. 3d 817, 433 N.E.2d 329 (1982).

311. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 851 (1979).
312. ILL. REV.STAT. ch. 48, § 1-101 (1980).
313. Hutchcraft v. City of Urbana, 104 Ill. App. 3d 817, 822, 433 N.E.2d 329,

333 (1982). The court cited no authority for this rule.
314. 85 Ill. 2d 101, 421 N.E.2d 196 (1981); see supra notes 302-07 and accompanying text.
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better analysis of the ordinance would have focused on the "pertaining to" analysis of section 6(a) of the constitution. Human
rights and discrimination are broad areas of statewide concern.
The legislature, pursuant to the constitutional mandate contained in the Illinois Bill of Rights, enacted legislation which
provides for a uniform standard of equality as well as enforcement standards and procedures. Clearly, this is not an area of
local concern. Therefore, the court more properly should have
found that the city overstepped the basic grant of home rule
3 15
powers contained in section 6(a).
The Illinois Supreme Court's position on the issue of legislative preemption in the area of home rule power is clear: a statute cannot preempt a local ordinance unless that statute
contains a specific provision which delineates the preemption.
Courts are further constrained by the Construction of Statutes
Act 316 which requires a specific statutory provision setting forth
the preemption. Against the authority cited above, however, an
appellate court may find that a comprehensive statutory scheme
indicates legislative intent to preempt home rule power. 3 17 Nevertheless, the overriding trend is to analyze such cases under
the "pertaining to" clause found in section 6(a). Further, courts
generally give great deference to the home rule power as expressed by the Constitutional Convention Committee 3 18 by requiring express statutory language of preemption.

V. HOME RULE TAX
A.

FinancingLocal Improvements by Special Assessment

Subsection 6(l) of article 7319 provides that the General Assembly may not limit or deny the power of home rule units to
finance local improvements by special assessment 320 or to levy
additional taxes to benefit special services areas. 321 This subsection accomplishes two purposes. By negative implication, it
315. Because the Illinois Supreme Court would probably have found the

ordinance invalid as an improper exercise of home rule power based on a
section 6(a) analysis, it is not difficult to understand why the City of Evanston's Petition for Certiorari was denied.
316. See supra note 299 and accompanying text.
317. See, e.g., Hutchcraft v. City of Urbana, 104 Ill. App. 3d 817, 433 N.E.2d
329 (1982).
318. The Constitutional Convention Committee on Local Government
made its position on preemption very clear, specifically acting to prohibit
judicial interpretation of legislation in search of legislative intent to preempt. See 4 Record of Proceedings, Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention 3034 (1969).
319. ILL. CONST. art. VII § 6(l).
320. ILL. CONST. art. VII § 6(l)(1).
321. ILL. CONST. art. VII § 6(l)(2).
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confers the power to tax for local improvements and special
service areas. 322 It also prevents the General Assembly from
limiting this power, 323 although the General Assembly may
deny the power to make special assessments for local improvements if it is denied to other classes of units of local
324
governments.
Subsection 6(l)(1), which provides that home rule units
may levy special assessments for local improvements, is not a
new power, but one traditionally given to local units of government. 325 The only limitation on this power is that the special
assessment tax must benefit the area taxed.326 A local improvement has been defined as a public improvement "which by reason of its being confined to a locality, enhances the value of
adjacent property as distinguished from benefits diffused by it
throughout the municipality. 327 The primary purpose and effect must be a benefit to the locality, even if there is an incidental public benefit 328 and the benefit must be demonstrated in
329
order to justify the additional taxes.
In contrast, subsection 6(l) (2) does create a new power.
The section gives home rule units the power to impose differential taxes. 330 This subsection accomplishes three distinct goals.
It gives home rule units as broad a power to deal with local
322. The express power to tax is conferred on home rule units by ILL.
CONST. art. VL § 6(a).

323. Subsection 6(l) is specifically excluded from subsections (g) and
(h), which permit the General Assembly to limit or deny the power to tax or
exercise other powers. See, Baum, A Tentative Survey of Illinois Home Rule
(PartII): Legislative Control, TransitionProblems, and Intergovernmental
Control, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 559, 564-66. For the history of subsection 6(l) and
its exclusion from subsections 6 (g) and (h), see Anderson and Lousin, From
Bone Gap to Chicago: A History of the Local Government Article of the 1970
Illinois Constitution, 9 J. MAR.J. PRAc. & PRoc. 697, 777-80 (1976).
324. ILL. CONST. art. VII § 6(l)(1).
325. Michael & Norton, Home Rule in Illinois. A Functional Analysis,
1978 U. ILL. L.F. 559, 595.

326. City of Edwardsville v. Jenkins, 376 Ill. 327, 329-30, 33 N.E.2d 598, 600
(1941).

327. City of Waukegan v. DeWolf, 258 Ill. 374, 377, 101 N.E. 532, 553 (1913).
328. Village of Downers Grove v. Bailey, 325 II. 186, 191, 156 N.E. 362, 363
(1927).

329. Village of Hinsdale v. Lowenstine, 23 Ill.
App. 3d 357, 360, 319 N.E.2d
83, 85 (1974).
330. The grant of power was clearly a departure from the requirement
of uniformity in ad valorem property taxation, and it was intended that
units of general local government, that is counties and municipalities,
should have the power to furnish special services and improvements to
limited areas within their geographic boundaries and to impose taxes
only on those areas that benefit from the service furnished or improvement received.
Hiken Furniture Company v. City of Belleville, 53 Ill.
App. 3d, 306, 309, 368
N.E.2d 353, 356 (1977). See also Walter Peckat Co. v. Regional Transp. Auth.,
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problems as that conferred upon non-home rule counties and
municipalities. 33 ' Second, it gives home rule units a more flexible means of financing improvements through the use of differential taxation. 332 Finally, it discourages the proliferation of
333
special units of local government for a single purpose.
Despite the express language of the Constitution, that the
General Assembly may not limit or deny the powers granted in
subsection 6(l), 334 the Illinois Supreme Court, in its first interpretation of subsection 6(l)(2), did just that.33 5 In Oak Park
Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Village of Oak
Park,336 the court held that the city ordinances which were enacted to create a special district to fund a shopping mall were
void. The court found the power conferred by the subsection
could only be exercised "in the manner provided by law" 337 and
interpreted this to mean that the General Assembly must enact
enabling legislation before this power could be exercised. 338 In
response to this decision, the General Assembly enacted the
Special Service Areas Act. 33 9 Now, most of the litigation concerning subsection 6(l) (2) involves an interpretation of the en34 0
abling legislation as well as the constitutional provision.
81 Ill.
2d 221, 407 N.E.2d 28 (1980) (differential taxing constitutional to fund
RTA).
331. ILL. CONST. art. VII § 7(6) (home rule and non-home rule power to
levy special service tax). Biebel, Home Rule in IllinoisAfter Two Years: An

Uncertain Beginning, 6 J. MARt.J. PRAc. & PRoc. 251, 285-86 (1973).
332. Biebel, supra note 330, at 286. The property benefitted must bear the
burden of the taxation, but the initial determination of benefit is made by
the taxing governmental entity. Andews v. County of Madison, 54 Ill.
App.
3d 343, 354, 369 N.E.2d 532, 540 (1977), Hiken Furniture Co. v. City of Bellevile, 53 Ill.
App. 3d 306, 310, 368 NE.2d 961, 964 (1977).
Special services are defined as: "all forms of services pertaining to the
government and affairs of the municipality or county, including but not limited to ...improvements permissible under Article 9 of the Illinois Municipal Code." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120 § 1302 (1983). Local improvements would
include streets, curbs, gutters, sanitary and storm sewers, water mains,
street lights, sidewalks, and parking lots but not profit centers such as retail
store buildings. Kane &Belkin, FinancialCommercial Development in Illinois by the Use of Various Forms of MunicipalBonds, 29 DE PAUL L. REV.
.1009, 1016 (1980).
333. Biebel, supra note 334, at 286. See also Anderson & Lousin, supra

note 322 at 778.
334. ILL. CONST. art. VII

§ 6(1).

335. Oak Park Fed. Say. &Loan Assoc. v. Village of Oak Park, 54 111.2d
200, 205, 296 N.E.2d 344, 348 (1973) (Ward, J., dissenting).
336. 54 Ill. 2d 200, 296 N.E.2d 344 (1973).
337. 54 Ill.
2d at 204, 296 N.E.2d at 347.
338. Id. at 203-04, 296 N.E.2d at 347-48.
339. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120 §§ 1301-1310.2 (1983).
340. E.g., Schwarzbach v. City of Highland Park, 82 Ill.
App. 3d 807, 403
N.E.2d 102 (1980) (issue of proper notice).
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In Ciaccio v. City of Elgin,341 for example, the plaintiffs
were taxpayers within a special service area created to build
and maintain a downtown parking lot. They contended that the
city had violated the enabling legislation by giving improper notice to owners of taxable personal property within the designated area, 342 by drawing erroneous boundaries for the
proposed area, 34 3 and by fling a non-complying map. 344 The Illinois Appellate Court for the Second District found, however,
that these technical objections did not invalidate the ordinances
because, in all respects, the ordinance substantially complied
with the enabling legislation. 34 5 This holding is consistent with
functhe express constitutional mandate that the powers and
346
construed.
liberally
be
"shall
units
rule
home
tions of
The plaintiffs in Ciaccio also raised questions as to the limitations on a home rule unit's power to exempt charitable and
religious organizations from the special service tax and to create
a district which included properties which received no benefits. 347 The court found that a disparity in benefits would not invalidate the ordinances creating the special district unless the
inequality was "so great as to be obviously unjust and irrational." 348 Here, there was no proof of such a disparity. 349 Nor
to
were the ordinances invalid as an impermissible attempt 350
"gerrymander" the distict in order to maximize revenues.
The plaintiffs contended that the boundaries of the district were
drawn to include a number of tax exempt properties which
would not oppose the special service levy because these proper341. 85 Ill. App. 3d 507, 407 N.E.2d 108 (1980).
342. Id. at 511, 407 N.E.2d at 111.

343. Id. at 512, 407 N.E.2d at 112.
344. Id.
345. Ciaccio v. City of Elgin, 85 Ill. App. 3d 507, 407 N.E.2d 108, 112 (1980).
See also Schwarzbach v. City of Highland Park, 82 Ill. App. 3d 807, 814, 403
N.E.2d 102, 107 (1980) (notice did not have to include a statement of
purpose).
346. ILL. CONST. art. VII § 6(m). Accord, Coryn v. City of Moline, 71 Ill. 2d
194, 200, 374 N.E.2d 211, 213 (1978) (the power to establish special services is
broad if construed liberally).
347. Ciaccio v. City of Elgin, 85 Ill. App. 3d 507, 516-17, 407 N.E.2d 108, 11415 (1980).
348. Id. Accord, Coryn v. City of Moline, 71 Ill. 2d 194, 201, 374 N.E.2d 211,
214 (1978) (taxes imposed need not directly correspond to the benefit);

Hiken Furniture Co. v. City of Belleville, 53 Ill. App. 3d 306, 311, 368 N.E.2d
961, 965 (1977) (a reasonable relationship is sufficient); Andrews v. County
of Madison, 54 Ill. App. 3d 343, 354, 369 N.E.2d 532, 540 (1977) (additional

taxes may be levied against property generally benefitting from the service
without a meticulous scrutiny of the benefit to each property).
349. Ciaccio v. City of Elgin, 85 Ill. App. 3d 507, 516, 407 N.E.2d 108, 115
(1980).

350. Id. at 516, 407 N.E.2d at 114-15.
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ties would not be subject to the tax. 35 1 The court found that the
mere inclusion 35 2 of these properties within the district was not
per se fraudulent. 35 3 Although there appears to be limits on the
ability of a home rule unit to create a plan which maximizes revenue, 354 those limits were not reached in Ciaccio because the
355
exempt properties were contiguous to taxable properties.
Also, the ordinance creating the special service district did not
contain any exceptions. 35 6 The exemptions only became appartax exempt
ent when the taxes were levied and the traditionally
3 57
properties were not included on the tax roll.
According to the Ciaccio court's interpretation of the enabling legislation and subsection 6(l) (2), home rule units have
considerable discretion in creating special service areas. The
home rule unit does not have to include all benefitted property
within the designated area, nor must the property that is included be benefitted equally. Also, the home rule unit may include property within the area which will not oppose the tax if it
is property that is traditionally not taxed, and the ordinance creating the special service area does not include this exemption.
This is not to say that a property which is exempt from general
revenue taxes is necessarily exempt from a special service
tax. 358 A home rule unit has the power, however, to continue the
359
exemption if it so chooses.
The ability of the home rule unit to exempt charitable and
religious organizations from a special service tax was clarified in
Elgin NationalBank v. Rowcliff,360 a case related to Ciaccio. In
Rowcliff, the plaintiffs sought a writ of mandamus in order to
compel the taxing authorities to include the exempt properties
on the tax roll. 36 1 The Appellate Court for the Second District
reiterated its finding that an exemption from general revenue
taxes did not necessarily exempt a property from a special serv351. Id. at 516-17, 407 N.E.2d at 114-15. See also Coryn v. City of Moline, 71

Ill. 2d 194, 202, 374 N.E.2d 211, 214 (1978) (not free to gerrymander without
regard to the rational relationship between the property served and the
property taxed).
352. Ciaccio v. City of Elgin, 85 Ill. App. 3d 507, 517-18, 407 N.E.2d 108, 11516 (1980).
353. Id.
354. Coryn v. City of Moline, 71 Ill. 2d 194, 202, 374 N.E.2d 211, 214 (1978).
355. Ciaccio v. City of Elgin, 85 Ill. App. 3d 507, 518, 407 N.E.2d 108, 116

(1980).

356. Id. at 115. 407 N.E.2d at 116.

357.
358.
359.
360.
361.

Id.
Id.
Id.
109 Ill. App. 3d 719, 441 N.E.2d 112 (1982).
Id. at 721, 441 N.E.2d at 114.
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ice tax. 362 The court found, however, that even absent a specific

exemption within the ordinance, compliance with the enabling
statute 363 would result in the exemption. 364 A special service tax
is imposed and levied in accordance with the Revenue Act of
1939,365 which accords charitable and religious organizations an

exemption. In addition, the enabling legislation does not prohibit the taxing authority from exempting traditionally tax exempt properties from a special service tax. The decision to
exempt certain properties, according to the court, is within the
discretion of the city, and the court will not interfere unless the
366
exemption is clearly unlawful and unauthorized.
According to the Second District Appellate Court, a home
rule unit has almost unbridled power to impose and levy taxes
for a special service area. Under this power, a home rule unit
may define the area to be served and exempt certain properties
within that area. Subsection 6(l) thus should provide a flexible
and practical tool that local governments may use to deal with
problems germane to each locality. 367 The more recent judicial

interpretations show a wilingness on the part of the courts to
construe subsection 6(l) liberally. Although there may be limitations on the power to tax under subsection 6(l), these limitations have yet to be clearly enunciated by the courts.
B. Limitations on the Taxing Powers
The Illinois Constitution of 1970 brought about a dramatic
change in a municipality's power to raise revenue by granting
home rule units the specific power to license and tax.368 This
power is limited, however, by provisions within article 7, section
362. Id. at 727, 441 N.E.2d at 117.
363. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120 § 1310 (1983).
364. Elgin Nat'l Bank v. Rowcliff, 109 Ill. App. 3d 719, 728, 441 N.E.2d 112,

118 (1982).
365. Id. at 730, 441 N.E.2d at 119. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120 §§ 500.1-500.23

(1983) exempts property used for churches, charitable organizations, property of political subdivisions, and public grounds owned by political
subdivisions.
366. Elgin Nat'l Bank v. Rowcliff, 109 Ill. App. 3d 719, 725, 441 N.E.2d 112,
119 (1982).
367. The Illinois courts have upheld various special service areas. Elgin
Nat'l Bank v. Rowcliff, 109 Ill. App. 3d 719, 441 N.E.2d 112 (1982), a shopping
mall, Coryn v. City of Moline, 71 Ill. 2d 194, 374 N.E.2d 211 (1978), a semimall, Hiken Furniture Co. v. City of Belleville, 53 Ill. App. 3d 306, 368 N.E.2d
961 (1977), and a sewage system, Andrews v. County of Madison, 54 Ill. App.
3d 343, 369 N.E.2d 532 (1977). The special service area is a procedure for
making improvements distinct from that of special assessments and which
avoids many of the complexities of special assessments. Andrews v.
County of Madison, 54 Ill. App. 3d 343, 369 N.E.2d 532, 540 (1977).
368. ILL. CONST. art. 7 § 6(a).
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These limitations specify that the unit may only license for
revenue or tax income, earnings, or occupations when the General Assembly specifically grants that power, 370 and that the
General Assembly may, by a vote of three-fifths of its members,
restrict the unit's taxing power.3 7 1 The limit on the home rule
taxing power is itself limited by the proviso that the power of
372
home rule units shall be construed liberally.
Until recently, the Illinois Supreme Court followed the liberal construction command and generally upheld taxes imposed
by home rule units. 373 In 1980, however, a tax on persons entering a horse racetrack was found to be an impermissible tax on
occupations. 374 Soon thereafter, the Illinois Supreme Court decided that even the constitutional command of liberal construc375
tion will not save a home rule unit's attempt to tax services.
This section discusses and analyzes three recent decisions of
the Illinois Supreme Court that establish some of the parameters of an occupation tax under article VII, section 6(e).
In Estate of Carey v. Village of Stickney,376 the plaintiffs
conducted horse races in Stickney, Illinois. The village, a home
rule unit, passed an ordinance requiring racetrack licensees to
pay a tax of ten cents for each person entering a racetrack with
an admission ticket. 377 The ordinance specifically allowed the
racetrack licensee to collect the tax from ticket holders in addition to the amount paid for the ticket. 378 The plaintiffs refused
to pay the tax and brought suit, claiming that it was an imper379
missible occupation tax.
The lower courts disagreed on the issue of whether the tax
was upon occupations; the circuit court holding that it was and
the appellate court holding it was not.380 The Illinois Supreme
6.369

369. Id. ILL. CONST. art. 7, § 6.
370. ILL. CONST. art. 7 § 6(e).

371. ILL. CONST. art. 7 § 6(g).
372. ILL. CONST. art. 7 § 6(m).
373. See Commercial Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. City of Chicago, 89 Ill. 2d
45, 49, 432 N.E.2d 227, 233 (1982) (court held city tax unconstitutional levy on
occupation).
374. Estate of Carey v. Village of Stickney, 81 111.2d 406, 411 N.E.2d 209
(1980).
375. Waukegan Community Unit School Dist. 60 v. City of Waukegan, 95
Ill. 2d 244, N.E.2d 345 (1983); Commercial National Bank of Chicago, 89 Ill.

2d 45, 432 N.E.2d 227 (1982).
376. 81 Ill. 2d 406, 411 N.E.2d 209 (1980).
377. Id. at 408, 411 N.E.2d 209.
378. Id. (quoting Stickney, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 18A, § 18A.02
(1965)).
379. 81 Ill. 2d at 410, 411 N.E.2d at 210.
380. 69 Ill. App. 3d 539, 542, 388 N.E.2d 120 (1979). Both courts relied on
Town of Cicero v. Fox Valley Trotting Club, Inc., 65 111. 2d 10, 357 N.E.2d 1118
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Court agreed with the circuit court and reversed the appellate
court. The supreme court noted that the ordinance was
designed to and did impose a tax upon a given occupation: those
licensed to conduct. horseracing. These two factors, the design
and actual imposition (incidence) of the tax made it an ocupation tax. The fact that the tax could be passed on to the ticketholders was inconsequential because it fell upon the racetrack1
38
operator and it is the legal incidence of the tax that controls.
Other similar tax ordinances which the court upheld had expressly placed the legal incidence of the tax upon the
382
consumer.
After the Carey decision, it seemed clear that the liberal
construction mandate, 383 would only save a home rule ordinance
that looked like an occupation tax if the incidence of the tax was
specifically placed upon the consumer. This would presumably
prove that the ordinance was neither designed to tax an occupation nor to impose a tax upon an occupation. 384 In 1982, however, the Illinois Supreme Court indicated that those who
provide services are in a special class of occupation and a home
if the legal incidence of the
rule unit could not tax them, even 385
tax was placed upon the consumer.
Pursuant to its purported home rule taxing powers conferred by the 1970 constitution, the City of Chicago adopted a
service tax ordinance which imposed a tax on "each purchaser
who purchases service in the City . ..at a rate of 1% of the
purchase price of such service. '386 Despite this declaration that
(1976). In Cicero, an ordinance imposed a tax on all amusements in the
town and made it unlawful for anyone to conduct an amusement for gain or
profit without paying the tax. Id. at 22, 357 N.E.2d at 1123. The Illinois
Supreme Court held that this was not an occupation tax because the tax
was not designed to fall on a given occupation. People who conduct amuse-

ments are not necessarily engaged in the occupation of conducting amuse-

ments. Thus, the tax is broader than an occupation tax and the fact that its

burden may fall on those engaged in a certain occupation is not enough to
classify it as an occupation tax. Id.
381. Estate of Carey, 81 Ill. 2d 406, 411 N.E.2d 209.

2d 491, 397
382. Kerasotes Rialto Theater Corp. v. City of Peoria, 77 Ill.
N.E.2d 790 (1979) (ordinance levying a 2% admission charge on the privilege

of participating or witnessing an amusement specifically placed the "ultimate incidence" upon the consumer. Id. at 494, 397 N.E.2d at 796. Mulligan
v. Dunne, 61 Ill. 2d 544, 338 N.E.2d 6 (1975) (tax on the retail sale of alcoholic

beverages to be borne by the consumer by its inclusion in the sale price
places the legal incidence of the tax on the consumer); Bloom Inc. v. Korshak, 52 Ill. 2d 56, 284 N.E.2d 257 (1972) (ordinance levying cigarette tax

states that tax shall be collected from the purchaser).
383. ILL. CONST. Art. 7 § 6(m).
384. Estate of Carey, 81 Ill. 406, 411 N.E.2d 209.

2d 45, 432 N.E.2d
385. Commercial National Bank v. City of Chicago, 89 Ill.
227 (1982).
386. MUNICIPAL CODE OF CMCAGO § 200.5-3 (1981).
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the legal incidence of the tax would fall on the purchaser, collection and remittance duties as well as liability for uncollected

387
taxes were imposed upon the seller.

In Commercial National Bank of Chicago v. City of Chicago,388 the supreme court sustained a challenge to the new
service tax ordinance. As one basis for the decision, the majority concluded that the service tax was unconstitutional because
it found the tax to be a levy upon occupations without authorization by the General Assembly. 389 The court held that any tax on
the privilege of engaging in the business of selling service is an
390
occupation tax within the meaning of the 1970 constitution.
Language in the majority opinion implied that this holding
would apply regardless of whether the legal incidence of the tax
39 1
fell on the seller or purchaser of services.
In discounting the relevance of who the legal incidence of
the tax was levied against, the majority created an important
distinction between the way it will analyze service tax ordinances as opposed to the way it presently analyzes non-service
tax ordinances. Non-service taxes were viewed as presumptively within the home rule unit's general power to tax.392 Only
when the legal incidence of a non-service tax falls upon the
seller of the subject matter of taxation would such tax be classi-

387. Id.
388. 89 Ill.
2d 45, 432 N.E.2d 227 (1982).
389. Id. at 47, 432 N.E.2d at 229.
390. Id. at 54, 432 N.E.2d at 235. The court relied on reference in the debates between delegates to the 1970 constitutional convention to their general understanding that service taxes, like the one before the court in
Commercial National, would be included in the definition of "occupation
tax" in section 6(e) of Article VII. Id. at 49, 432 N.E.2d at 230-32.
391. The majority stated:
So far in this opinion we, as was the case with the delegates to the constitutional convention, have not drawn the fine line of distinction between a tax imposed upon the seller of services and one imposed upon
the purchaser of these services. Those who opposed the restriction on
the power to tax occupations in the constitutional convention saw this
limitation as an impediment to taxing the sale of services, regardless of
whether such a tax could technically be considered an occupation tax
or a sales tax.
Id. at 62, 432 N.E.2d at 235.
392. Id. at 63, 432 N.E.2d at 235. Non-service taxes distinguished by the
court include taxes imposed upon the sale of cigarettes, Bloom Inc. v. Korshak, 52 Ill. 2d 56, 284 N.E.2d 257 (1972), or on the sale of alcoholic beverages,
Mulligan v. Dunne, 61 Ill. 2d 544, 338 N.E.2d 6 (1975), taxes imposed on the
privilege of attending an amusement, City of Cicero v. Fox Valley Trotting
Club, Inc., 65 Ill. 2d 10, 357 N.E.2d 1118 (1978); Kerasotes Rialto Theater Theater Corp. v. City of Peoria, 77 Ill. 2d 421, 397 N.E.2d 790 (1979), taxes on the
privilege of occupying a parking place, Jacobs v. City of Chicago, 53 Ill. 2d
421, 292 N.E.2d 401 (1973), and taxes on the privilege of employing workers,
Paper Supply Co. v. City of Chicago, 57 Ill. 2d 553, 317 N.E.2d 3 (1974). The
taxes at issue in each of these cases were upheld by the court.
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fled as an "occupation tax. '393 When faced with a service tax
ordinance, however, the court apparently does not even need to
reach the issue of legal incidence, because the constitutional
limitation on home rule occupation taxes was specifically intended by the delegates to the 1970 Illinois constitutional convention to preclude the taxation of services without reference to
3 94
legal incidence.
Despite its display of the delegate's general disregard for
the legal incidence factor, the court partially relied on this factor
to support its holding. After noting that the ordinance declares,
on its face, that the tax is imposed upon the purchaser of services, the court found that the practical operation of the tax was
to place responsibilities and liabilities (i.e., the legal incidence)
for the tax upon the seller of services. 395 The court further observed that if all home rule units adopted similar tax ordinances,
and if such ordinances were held constitutionally valid, "[t]he
seller of services would be required to keep records for every
home rule unit in which he provided services, and his books and
records would be subject to audit by each. '396 Such a result
would directly conflict with one of the General Assembly's
stated reasons for precluding local occupation taxes:
unimpaired efficiency in the operation of business within the
39 7
state.
Whether the court's limited discussion regarding the legal
incidence of the Chicago service tax was meant to provide only
supplemental support for its holding or, rather, to denote its
general reluctance to part with a factor that has traditionally
played a central role in its analyses of home rule tax power
questions, 398 was not made entirely clear by the Commercial National opinion. If this decision is read to include the legal incidence factor in the analysis of the validity of a subsequent
service tax ordinance which truly imposes all duties of remittance and collection and liability for non-payment upon the pur393. E.g., Estate of Carey v. Village of Stickney, 81 Ill. 2d 406, 411 N.E.2d
209 (1980). The court alluded to another class of non-service taxes which

would be most obviously classified as occupation taxes: taxes imposed upon
specific trades, businesses or professions. Commercial National at 440, 432

N.E.2d at 234.

394. See supra note 394.

395. Commercial National at 442, 423 N.E.2d at 238.
396. Id.
397. Id
398. See, e.g., Estate of Carey v. Village of Stickney, 81 111.2d 406, 412, 411
N.E.2d 209, 211 (citing Kerasotes Rialto Theatre Corp. v. City of Peoria, 77
Ill. 2d 491, 397 N.E.2d 790); Mulligan v. Dunne, 61 Ill. 2d 544, 338 N.E.2d 6;
Bloom, Inc. v. Korshak, 52 Ill. 2d 56, 284 N.E.2d 257; First Nat'l Bank v. Jones,
48 Ill. 2d 282, 269 N.E.2d 494; National Bank v. Isaacs, 27 Ill. 2d 205, 188 N.E.2d

704 (1963).
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chaser, such tax may arguably survive constitutional scrutiny.
This result, however, would be difficult to justify in light of the
unequivocal intent of the convention delegates to limit local taxation of the sale of services regardless of legal incidence. 399 Accordingly, when the Illinois Supreme Court next spoke, it
seemingly eliminated the analytical relevance of the legal incidence of a service tax.
In Waukegan Community Unit School District 60 v. City of
Waukegan,400 consumer utility taxes imposed by home rule
units were at issue.401 The home rule units Waukegan, Evanston, Oak Park, and Rosemont all enacted ordinances that taxed
40 2
purchasers of goods and services from certain public utilities.
The taxes were specifically placed upon the consumers, although they were collected by the utilities and then paid to the
respective home rule units. 4° 3 The court began its analysis by
noting that the holding of Commercial National4 4 applied because public utilities render services, are "engaged in service occupations," 4 5 and the delegates to the constitutional convention
intended that occupation taxes not be imposed by home rule
40 6
units without legislative authorization.
Although the utilities did provide the products of gas and
electricity to customers, the court found the provision of products to be incidental to their primary function, the rendering of
services.4 ° 7 The court then held that all home rule taxes on
transactions consisting primarily of the sale of services were
prohibited by the Illinois Constitution unless specifically au4° 8
thorized by the legislature.
This holding makes the legal incidence of a tax and services
irrelevant. If a tax is levied on services and without the required
legislative approval, the tax can be characterized as an occupation tax no matter where the legal incidence falls. This proposi399.
400.
401.
402.
403.
404.
405.

See supra note 394.
95 Ill. 2d 244, 447 N.E.2d 345 (1983).
Id. at 249, 447 N.E.2d at 347.
Id.
Id. at 253, 447 N.E.2d at 349.
89 Ill. 2d 45, 432 N.E.2d 227 (1982).
95 Ill. 2d at 252, 447 N.E.2d at 348.

406. Id. This reasoning is faulty because it implies that any home rule
unit tax that is at all related to an occpuation is an impermissible tax upon
the occupation. The court previously stated clearly that the legal incidence

of a tax determined if the tax was upon an occupation or the consumer.
Estate of Carey v. Village of Stickney, 81 Ill.
2d 406, 412, 411 N.E.2d 209, 211

(1980) (citing First Nat'l Bank v. Jones, 48 Ill. 2d 282, 288, 269 N.E.2d 494

(1971); National Bank v. Isaacs, 27 Ill. 2d 205, 207, 188 N.E.2d 704 (1963)).
407. 95 Ill. 2d at 253, 447 N.E.2d at 349.
408. Id. at 254, 447 N.E.2d at 349.
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tion finds support in the court's declaration that "the 1970
constitution prohibits all taxes applicable to transactions principally consisting of the sale of 'services'." 409 Nevertheless, the
courts again included in its analysis a discussion regarding the
legal incidence of the utility taxes in question. As additional
support for its holding, it cited the fact that the "practical operation" of the tax was an attempt to impose a tax upon the services
the utilities provided to the public. 410 The court found significance in the ordinance's lack of any provision for the collection
of unpaid taxes from the consumer. It further noted that the
utility rather than the consumer faced the burden of record4 11
keeping, as well as the penalty for failing to pay the taxes.
Despite these observations, the high court's utilization of
the legal incidence factor in the analysis of a home rule ordinance which taxes service transactions is most probably surplusage. It appears the court's reliance on the delegate's
preclusion of any type of home rule taxation of such transactions would have been sufficient, in and of itself, to strike down
the ordinance in question in both Commercial National and
Waukegan. In breaking new ground in the interpretation of section 6(e)'s home rule taxation limitations, the court apparently
found solace in the fact that the legal incidence factor, in both of
these cases, would support its invalidation of the tax ordinances
in question. It necessarily follows, however, that if the court is
confronted with a challenge to a service tax ordinance at a later
date that imposed all legal burdens and obligations upon the
purchaser of the services, the drafter's mandate would seem to
compel the invalidation of such an ordinance.
The result of the supreme court's three recent examinations
of the occupation tax limitation provision is an analytical bifurcation, separating service from non-service taxes. When the
subject matter of taxation consists primarily of the sale of services, the court, following Commercial National and Waukegan,
will invalidate the tax as beyond the constitutional powers of
the taxing home rule unit unless specifically authorized by the
General Assembly. When the subject matter of taxation consists primarily of non-service items, the court, following Carey
will invalidate the tax only if the legal incidence falls on the
seller of such items; thereby rendering such tax an "occupation
tax" as defined by section 6(e). Accordingly, future litigation in
this area would most likely focus upon whether the ordinance in
question taxes services or not.
409. Id. (Emphasis added.)

410. Id.
411. Id. at 256, 447 N.E.2d at 350.

ERRATUM
The book review in Vol. 17:1, page 243, by Richard Ausness, incorrectly lists the Agricultural
Law treatise as containing 118 pages. The correct number of pages for this two-volume set is
1,472 pages.

